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CONCEIVING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR AN ASIAN 
ENVIRONMENT 
David C. Donald* 
Nearly all Chinese corporations are vehicles used by a 
separate system or social network—such as a family, a state, or a 
political party.  Available data show a similar pattern in other Asian 
countries.  The challenges presented by the corporation operating as 
a system within a system are in most instances ignored by the modern 
business corporation structure and related doctrine.  This is just as 
true under Chinese and Hong Kong law as under that of the United 
States or the United Kingdom.  The dominant model of corporate 
governance understands the company as a vehicle in which financial 
investors and operational management coexist for the sole purpose 
of profit.  Other systematic relationships among persons operating 
the corporation are recognized only as potential sources of power 
and information asymmetries that exploit financial investor 
constituencies.  This ignores both data on who owns most companies 
and a deep body of empirical scholarship demonstrating the 
advantages enjoyed by family enterprises—from profitability and 
longevity to lower executive compensation and transaction costs. 
This Article uses institutional and systems theory tools to 
begin development of a model of corporate governance dynamics that 
takes real account of the systems that coexist with the corporate 
vehicle.  It uses the initial examples of the family and the political 
party to propose a corporate structure in which social networks and 
value systems can meaningfully communicate with the governance 
rules of the corporation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: CORPORATE LAW AND THE SOCIAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
A. Governance Rules Focus on Individuals and Their Interests 
The governance rules of corporate law seek to align the 
interests and behavior of individual corporate actors in a way that best 
serves a company’s economic performance.1  This is achieved by 
using duties to frame decision-making, specifying permitted and 
prohibited acts, requiring disclosure, and creating a series of 
incentives and disincentives for corporate actors.2  Governance rules 
use increasingly sophisticated techniques to channel the interests of 
individual players, but they are not designed to interact with entire 
networks of institutionally channeled interaction that are present in a 
                                                                                                               
 1 While arguments about the exact definition of corporate governance abound, the 
general goal expressed above corresponds to what is found both in codes formulated by 
public bodies and in scholarly analysis.  See, e.g., OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE Preamble 11 (2004) (stating that “[c]orporate governance involves a set of 
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders.  Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the objectives 
of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined.  Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives 
for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company 
and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring.”); JONATHAN R. MACEY, 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 1 (2008) (stating that 
“corporate governance is about reducing deviance by corporations where deviance is defined 
as any actions by management or directors that are at odds with the legitimate, investment-
hacked expectations of investors.  Good corporate governance, then, is simply about keeping 
promises.  Bad governance (corporate deviance) is defined as promise-breaking behavior.”); 
MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 203–204 (2003) 
(stating that “[c]orporate governance can be analyzed solely in terms of the inner workings 
of the corporation: the mechanical requirements for the board of directors, the degree to 
which minority stockholders are protected from insider machinations . . . [But] [f]or 
corporate governance, the [major sources of influence] are labor markets, politics, and 
capital and product markets.”); MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (1976) (stating that “[c]orporate law is constitutional 
law; that is, its dominant function is to regulate the manner in which the corporate institution 
is constituted, to define the relative rights and duties of those participating in the institution, 
and to delimit the powers of the institution vis-à-vis the external world.”). 
 2 REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 37–39 (2d ed. 2009) (stating that these strategies can be 
organized into a schema as appointment rights, decision rights, agent incentives, agent 
constraints and affiliation terms). 
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corporation’s environment.3  The only exception to this characteristic 
of corporate law design is the network of the financial system, the 
needs of which are deeply imbedded not only in the design of the 
corporate shares’ transferability,4 but also in rules on management 
and shareholder behavior when operating, and particularly when 
financing, the company.5  Other systematic networks of values, such 
as the family or the state, actively define relationships among the 
owners of most corporations, 6  but corporate law does not adjust 
specifically to take them into account as useful systems.  Ethical 
frameworks like those found in “corporate social responsibility” 
(CSR) or “corporate sustainability” also present value systems that 
could define relationships among corporate actors, but these positions 
are recognized at most through disclosure requirements, with no 
integration into company operation other than by appeals to investor 
preference and an ethical belief that one can “do well” financially by 
“doing good.”7 
                                                                                                               
 3 The environmental factors on which this paper focuses can be thought of as a system 
of values or ‘motivation matrix’ that assigns incentives and its own unique functional values 
to objects or actions.  It can be understood either objectively (a matrix of values established 
systemically) or subjectively (a matrix of value choices made by a member of the system, 
qua member).  The values determined in one system may overlap with those fixed in other 
value systems or may differ therefrom.  For example, the profit motive enshrined in the 
system of company law will correspond to a key drive of either the family or the state when 
using the corporate form. 
 4 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985) (explaining that a primary function of limited liability, the most 
unique characteristic of the stock corporation, is to allow free transferability of shares). 
 5 As a company moves closer to the capital market (from private to public or closely 
held to widely held) and is eventually listed, corporate law allows major changes to take 
place to the company’s board structure, the decision-making prerogative of shareholders, 
and the structure of its share capital.  These changes are seen as not only acceptable, but also 
necessary because linking into the financial system is understood to be a completely natural 
and desirable aspect of the company’s existence. 
 6 Figures on family firms and state owned corporations are discussed in detail in Part 
III, Section A. The special problems of corporate groups could also benefit from the 
systematic analysis offered here.  The major tension of a group is that the systematic drive 
of the group’s aims straddles individual companies and can come into conflict with corporate 
law as it applies to such companies. 
 7 Empirical studies have indeed shown that socially directed investment can be 
profitable.  See, e.g., JACOB GRAY ET. AL, WHARTON SOCIAL IMPACT INITIATIVE OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA (WSII), GREAT EXPECTATIONS: MISSION PRESERVATION AND 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE IN IMPACT INVESTING (2015), https://socialimpact.wharton.
upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Great-Expectations-Mission-Preservation-and-
Financial-Performance-in-Impact-Investing.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DYJ-BHEF] (explaining 
that socially directed investment can be profitable).  However, this does not in any way affect 
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Not only do networks of value like the family greatly 
determine interpersonal relationships in most companies, but it has 
been shown repeatedly that they make tangible contributions to 
corporate operations.8  The presence of such systems is, however, at 
best taken into account in a cosmetic way (disclosure on CSR) and at 
worst condemned in advance as dangerous (family ownership equals 
crony governance).  The family is understood primarily as an 
impediment to the corporation’s fair and efficient operation.  State 
ownership is seen as an impediment to a corporation’s profitability, 
and ethical or social goals are generally tolerated to the extent that 
they do not disrupt the drive to profit.  This exclusion can occur 
without notice because very little effort is made to grasp how the 
corporation interacts systematically with its real environment.  For 
example, if a corporation were used as a vehicle for a family business, 
the matrix of family values might well attribute importance to an end 
like “promotion of autonomous family control,” but corporate law 
could alternatively categorize the actions serving this end as abusive 
entrenchment, so that a key aim of the family-held corporation would 
be condemned a priori as illegitimate. 
The regulatory thrust of corporate law is to bring individual 
interests of corporate actors into sync with the network of assigned 
corporate roles and tasks.9  Regardless of whether a given interest 
derives from a network of values having great social importance, if 
the interest has not yet been brought within the set of individual 
interests made legitimate through corporate law, it will come under 
consideration for sanction.  The main stated aim of penalizing such 
action is to protect shareholders or minority shareholders from abuse, 
but there is no reason to doubt that this aim could be achieved even 
when corporate law takes into account the complexity of its real 
environment.  Currently, most corporate governance rules are 
designed to single out and exorcise individual actions of corporate 
                                                                                                               
the design of corporate law to offer a vehicle in which individuals may pursue profit by 
collective action through the proxy of the corporate vehicle. 
 8 Part III, Section A of this Article contains a discussion of such factors. 
 9 Affirmative powers, such as the right to call or vote at a meeting, or to allot shares 
or enter into a business combination, are assigned in ways to allow efficient operation of the 
company while respecting a balance of power within the company; whereas, duties of care 
and of loyalty (in the United Kingdom, the fiduciary duty) direct behavior to the good of the 
company and its members. See, e.g., the discussion of agency problems and legal strategies 
in KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 39–49. 
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players if they are seen as in conflict with the company’s (or 
shareholders’) good. 10   This occurs regardless of whether such 
actions derive from competing networks of significant importance for 
society, or even for the long-term existence of the company—such as 
the family, a political party, a religion, a philosophy of CSR, ethical 
investing, or some other grid of norms.  These alternative networks 
taken as a whole remain alien to the fabric of corporate law, and they 
are informally assigned values ranging from cosmetic to disruptive 
and even to sinister.11 
Only specialized studies, such as those on the “family firm,”12 
make any attempt to incorporate the interests that arise from 
competing value systems within the defined dynamics of corporate 
law.  Otherwise, the motivations generated by such value networks 
are simply excluded or subjected to disclosure, and perhaps sanitation, 
                                                                                                               
 10 Conflicts of interest and potential conflicts of interest (related-party transactions) are 
the target of the fiduciary duty (in the U.K. tradition) and the duty of loyalty (in the U.S. 
tradition).  The conflict arises between a duty to the company (or its shareholders) and a 
personal interest of the corporate actor (director or controlling shareholder in the United 
States), and such personal interests will include the interests of related parties, such as family 
members of the corporate actor.  See, e.g., ANDREAS CAHN & DAVID C. DONALD, 
COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: TEXT AND CASES ON THE CORPORATE LAWS OF GERMANY, 
THE UK AND THE USA 332–368 (1st ed. 2010) (containing a discussion of the duties and 
related cases). 
 11 Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 510 
(1999) (stating that “[f]amily control may facilitate corruption because it gives the 
controlling shareholders enormous autonomy in decision making, keeps the potential 
whistle-blowers out of major corporate decisions, and thus reduces the risk of getting caught.  
According to this theory, family control is especially important in the most corrupt 
countries.”).  On state control, see RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD 
OF CHINA’S COMMUNIST RULERS 9–10 (2010) (“The modern world is replete with examples 
of elite networks that wield behind-the-scenes power . . . The United Kingdom had the ‘old 
boy network’ . . . France has ‘les énarques’ . . . Japan has the Todai elite . . . None can hold 
a candle to the Chinese Communist Party, which takes ruling-class networking to an entirely 
new level.  The ‘red machine’ [internal telephone] gives the party apparatus a hotline into . . . 
the government-owned companies that China promotes around the world these days as 
independent commercial entities.”). 
 12 For example, articles published in the Family Business Review or texts such as 
MORTEN BENNEDSEN & JOSEPH P.H. FAN, THE FAMILY BUSINESS MAP (2014) and SABINE B. 
KLEIN, FAMILIENUNTERNEHMEN: THEORETISCHE UND EMPIRISCHE GRUNDLAGEN (2d ed. 2004) 
incorporate in very different ways particular aspects of family relationships into the 
operation of stock corporations, but in doing so clearly see family firms as a particular subset 
of corporations.  Similar treatment for firms owned by a parent in a related industry and tied 
by supply contracts or firms owned by a parent in an unrelated industry as part of a 
diversified group are not viewed with a like level of cottage peculiarity. 
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in their individual appearances.13  Given the obvious presence (if not 
dominance) of such value systems within corporations and their 
potential contribution to corporate operations, 14  they should be 
brought expressly within corporate governance theory.  This paper 
outlines one avenue to that end by using a systems theory analysis to 
frame a common ground on which to conceive, as “systems,” both 
the company as a product of corporate law and the value networks 
that may strongly influence the relationships among company actors.  
The example this Article has chosen for beginning this undertaking 
is the Asian company, given the historical, cultural and economic 
circumstances that have led to a prominent position for either the 
family or the state in many Asian corporations, large and small. 
There is good reason for using both the family and the state 
(or political party) as two main examples of value networks to be 
integrated into corporate governance, and limiting analysis to those 
two systems.  In their histories, these two value systems have often 
been diametrically opposed politically after the fall of dynastic 
royalty—the powerful families were no friends of state power, and 
communist governments in particular made great efforts to purge the 
royal and bourgeoisie families from a prominent role in the 
economy.15  By examining them both, this paper abstracts away from 
a single social phenomenon or political stance and formulates a 
scheme of corporate governance that allows an entire system of 
values to be integrated into that system we call corporate governance.  
Once this framework has been set out, it will facilitate a next step into 
less traditional value systems, such as philosophies of CSR or 
corporate sustainability.  The aim of this analysis is to provide a 
systemic view of company law that allows it to interlock with its 
environment.  This is undertaken in an apolitical way, completely 
agnostic as to whether wealthy families, a socially engaged state, or 
profit-seeking investors should take stewardship of an economy.  
                                                                                                               
 13 Criteria for independence applied to directors filter out those with family ties to an 
interest to be avoided, and disclosure of related-party transactions ensure that intersections 
with an alternative value network like a family are made known.  Both are discussed in Part 
IV. 
 14 See infra the discussion in Part III. 
 15 SHEILA FITZPATRICK, EVERYDAY STALINISM 142 (1999) (quoting, “In the 1920s, 
Communist attitudes toward the family were often hostile.  ‘Bourgeois’ and ‘patriarchal’ 
were two words often coupled with ‘family.’  The conventions observed by respectable 
society before the revolution were dismissed as ‘petty-bourgeois philistinism.’”). 
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This would allow an opening of corporate law to various 
environments, well beyond the financial system, which currently 
presents the company’s most legally acceptable matrix of use, 
purpose and design.16 
B. Coupling Companies and Other Systematic Networks 
In developing a resourced-based analytical model to isolate 
and evaluate the effect on corporate performance of control by a 
family, Habbershon and Williams summarize the need to understand 
how the two systems of “family” and “firm” interact and also note the 
incentives pushing corporate law to simply exclude the exogenous 
network from the inner workings of the firm: 
There is also the broader problem of connecting 
complex behavioral and social phenomena within 
family businesses to traditional performance criteria.  
The systemic relationship between the family and the 
business creates categories of organizational behavior 
that are not easily identified as components of value 
creating strategies.  It appears easier to ignore or rid 
the firm of the complexity, rather than address the 
sources of complexity as a potential for advantage.17 
When corporate law ignores or flatly prohibits influence from 
the complex networks of motivations found in groups operating a 
firm, it takes the simpler route; however, this strategy merely turns a 
blind eye to motivations that are not only present in most companies, 
but can also lower transaction and agency costs within the firm.18  
                                                                                                               
 16 As will be discussed in Part IV, Section A.2, the corporate form and rules of 
corporate law have been generously adjusted over the last century to facilitate the connection 
between the company and the financial system.  Connection to and influence by the financial 
system is not seen as external to the company and in any way dangerous—as would be 
ownership by a family or the state—but rather a feature that enlivens the company and brings 
it to itself. 
 17 Timothy G. Habbershon & Mary L. Williams, A Resource-Based Framework for 
Assessing the Strategic Advantages of Family Firms, 12 FAM. BUS. REV. 1, 6 (1999). 
 18 This paper focuses primarily on the rules of corporate governance found in U.S. and 
U.K. law, with additional specific reference to Hong Kong (which greatly resembles the 
United Kingdom).  It could be argued that German law does a better job of allowing 
alternative networks to coexist within the firm, and codetermination is just one example of 
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Leading jurisdictions have been prepared to alter the form of the 
business corporation in many ways, such as to optimize tax treatment 
with limited liability companies or allow sole proprietors to 
incorporate alone.19  Thus, it is more than just a little unusual that 
through roughly 200 years of modern corporate history,20 no concrete 
steps have been taken toward creating a system of company 
relationships that seriously engages the operative environment of 
business corporations. 
When the management of a corporation is understood as a 
collection of individuals whose interests must be aligned to that of 
the company (or its shareholders, qua investor) or be excluded, 
factoring in networking systems from the environment is difficult, 
even if such systems are employing the company as a vehicle for their 
business.  An individual is not a network of values but can interact 
with other actors within one.  The lack of a systematic approach 
linking the company and the systems that affect relationships among 
its members abstracts away from real actors and posits hypothetical 
individual corporate actors with a pure profit drive.  The real actors 
as found in the environment from which they originate are then 
supposed to have tendencies to engage in self-interested 
transactions21 or make unwise decisions diverging from the profit 
incentive.22  If, as estimates show, most companies are incorporated 
for use by a family or the state, it is inappropriate that such use of the 
                                                                                                               
such systematic inclusion.  The proposals offered in this paper remain within the framework 
of U.S., U.K., and Hong Kong law and do not tack onto the many attempts to bring German 
principles or constructs into the “Anglo-American” corporate law model. 
 19 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Making Sense of Entity Rationalization, 58 BUS. LAW. 
1023 (2003) (explaining rationalizations behind the emergence of limited liability 
companies). 
 20 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1335, 1393–95 (2006) (stating that the New York General Incorporation Act of 1811 can be 
seen as the first modern corporate law). 
 21 Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Family Control and the Rent-Seeking Society, 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, THEORY AND PRACTICE 391, 405 (2004) (arguing that trust among the 
family members, which is essentially a network effect of the family, leads to rent-seeking 
and corruption in a family firm, so that “[p]rofessional managers with brief careers might be 
socially preferable to enduring family control over large corporations.”). 
 22 MCGREGOR, supra note 11, at 101.  McGregor discusses with disparaging amusement 
how executives of China’s state owned enterprises were not permitted to cash in the 
“windfalls of millions of dollars through options granted to them after offshore listings,” as 
they were rather forced to pledge such profits to the state if they wanted to move up in the 
communist party hierarchy. 
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corporate form should trigger suspicion of abuse.  Moreover, at least 
with regard to family firms, numerous studies have shown that the 
family network influences company operations in beneficial ways,23 
so ignoring such networks or excluding them from corporate law 
probably damages the enterprise.  Corporate law should provide a 
coupling that preserves the operational nature of both the 
environmental network of values (such as a family) and, in particular, 
those corporate governance rules designed to stop the corporate form 
from becoming an arena for extracting rents and abusing outside 
investors. 
Systems theory is the natural tool to bring the systems of 
corporate law on the one hand, and intersecting networks of values 
and motivations (like the family or the state) on the other hand, into 
interoperable coordination.24  Luhmann, in particular, has offered 
valuable theoretical insights on how both law and society function as 
separate and self-generating systems that are linked dynamically.25  
Luhmann isolates certain legal concepts and examines their function 
using the term “structural couplings,” as they link law to its larger 
social environment.26  For example, items important in society, such 
as land, money, and technology, are linked to legal systems through 
the concept of property in the form of leases, negotiable instruments, 
and patents.  The legal concepts take their shape from the needs of 
the real, social phenomena, and the social forms of possession and 
transfer of these phenomena take shape according to the conceptual 
structure of the legal system.  Luhmann’s configuration of the 
                                                                                                               
 23 Primarily because family control tends to mean a long-term business outlook, 
reduced transaction costs in the company among members of the family network, and 
reduced agency costs due to informal bonding arising from family relationships.  For a 
discussion of the effects of families on firms, see Part III, Section A. 
 24 Timothy G. Habbershon, Mary Williams & Ian C. MacMillan, A Unified Systems 
Perspective of Family Firm Performance, 18 J. BUS. VENTURING 451, 453 (2003) (“For 
nearly 2 decades, the two or three overlapping circles models . . . have been the standard 
theoretical models for picturing family and business as interlinking systems that explain the 
competitive tensions in strategy making.”).  See also James J. Chrisman et al., A Unified 
Systems Perspective of Family Firm Performance: An Extension and Integration, 18 J. BUS. 
VENTURING 467 (2003) (extending and integrating the theoretical contributions of 
Habbershon et al. by substituting value creation for wealth creation as the defining function 
of family businesses). 
 25 See NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT [LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM] 
550 (1993). 
 26 Id. at 440–495. 
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“structural coupling” is a good framework for expressly recognizing 
systematic networks of social values intersecting with and inside of 
corporate law.  Existing concepts in corporate governance can be 
adjusted and new concepts can be formulated to give legal substance 
to real systems of relationships defining interactions among corporate 
actors. 
C. Adjusting Corporate Governance to the Asian Social 
Environment 
While the available, largely estimated data shows family 
firms are dominant globally, with approximately half of U.S.-listed 
companies, and about 60% of all European businesses, controlled by 
families,27 there are good reasons why Asia is an appropriate starting 
point for a project opening corporate governance to environmentally 
prominent networks of values.  First, family firms are statistically 
more prevalent in the Asian private sector than they are in the West.28  
Second, and perhaps most importantly, the history of Asia diverges 
from that of the West in ways that have left the ancient importance of 
the extended family relatively intact.29  Third, Asian countries have 
without exception imported their corporate law.  The models were 
originally developed in Western countries and transplanted 
voluntarily, through colonization, or following military victory.30  As 
                                                                                                               
 27 Global Data Points, FAM. FIRM INST., http://www.ffi.org/?page=globaldatapoints 
[https://perma.cc/GS9C-5HUS] (last visited Feb. 17, 2017). 
 28 Family firms constitute an estimated 85% of China’s private enterprises and about 
79% of “organized private sector employment” in India.  Id. 
 29 As will be discussed in Part III, Section B, history shows that Christianity in Europe 
did much to dissolve the power of ancient clans over the individual as a holder of rights, 
which freed the individual for primary membership in other organizations, such as the early 
corporations operating municipalities and guilds. 
 30 On the transplantation of corporate law into mainland China, see JIANGYU WANG, 
COMPANY LAW IN CHINA 3–7 (2014) (discussing a brief history of China’s company law).  
On the transplantation into colonial Hong Kong, see DAVID C. DONALD, A FINANCIAL 
CENTRE FOR TWO EMPIRES: HONG KONG’S CORPORATE, SECURITIES AND TAX LAWS IN ITS 
TRANSITION FROM BRITAIN TO CHINA 104–169 (2014) (discussing the development of Hong 
Kong’s corporate and securities laws as a response to Hong Kong being China’s international 
financial center).  On the shaping of Japanese company law following World War II, see 
Bruce Aronson, Postwar Reform of Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: 
Democratization under the Occupation and the Japanese Reaction, in LAW AND PRACTICE 
IN POSTWAR JAPAN: THE POSTWAR LEGAL REFORM AND THEIR INFLUENCE 59 (International 
House of Japan & Blakemore Foundation eds. 2010) (discussing two opposing views on the 
necessity and success of reforming of Japanese corporate law in 1950); see also Hideki 
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such, they have a law that did not grow out of their social institutions.  
Fourth, given the current point of China’s economic development in 
its transition away from a fully planned economy, most of China’s 
globally significant firms are state owned enterprises (SOEs).  As will 
be discussed in Part III, Section C, the Central Personnel Committee 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) controls executive 
appointments and career advancement in these SOEs.  For these 
reasons, the project of integrating actual networks of values from the 
social and political environment into corporate governance can 
favorably begin with Asia. 
A good specimen of corporate law on which to focus while 
attempting to link environmental systems to the system of corporate 
governance is that of Hong Kong.  Hong Kong’s company law 
originated in and remains very close to that of the United Kingdom, 
both in statutory and common law elements.31  U.K. law was passed 
to most of Britain’s colonial network, has significant similarities to 
that of the United States, and has influenced E.U. company law.  
Hong Kong company law therefore presents a good example of the 
global standard for corporate law, making it one of the world’s most 
important commercial laws.  The economy of Hong Kong is 
dominated by companies controlled either by families or the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC),32 so that abstract corporate doctrine of the 
detached individual engaging in the company to pursue personal 
profit is closely juxtaposed with the reality of value networks 
determining much of the behavior of corporate actors.  Regulators 
and lawmakers are aware that the socioeconomic character of Hong 
Kong does not always match the governance model codified in 
corporate law and have made some small adjustments to the standard 
corporate law model.33  However, Hong Kong company law and 
                                                                                                               
Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-Examining Legal Transplants: The Director’s Fiduciary 
Duty in Japanese Corporate Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887 (2003) (discussing the role of legal 
transplants in corporate law by examining Japan’s transplantation of the director’s duty of 
loyalty). 
 31 For a history of the development of Hong Kong company law, see DONALD, supra 
note 30, at 22–33 (discussing the foundations of Hong Kong’s legal system), 111–22 
(discussing law transplanted only as the need arose). 
 32 See DONALD, supra note 30, at 62–101 (explaining the ownership of the largest 
companies in the major segments of Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index). 
 33 For example, the Model Articles for Public Companies provide for the possibility of 
a “managing director” who may be appointed without being subjected to future elections and 
may be given powers equal to those of the entire board, to the exclusion of the powers of the 
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listing rules mirror international standards in large part by focusing 
on individuals and linking external value networks to conflicts of 
interest.  Where this Article offers recommendations in the context of 
a specific body of corporate law, it will use Hong Kong law as a case 
study. 
Following this introduction, Part II will present the tools used 
in this Article’s system theoretic analysis.  Part III examines the 
problem of companies operating at the intersection between corporate 
law and two major systems of roles and values, the family and the 
CCP.  The first section of Part III will review existing scholarship on 
the family within the operation of corporations.  The second section 
of Part III will discuss the way in which the roles and duties of the 
CCP enter into the operation of a corporation.  Part IV will then 
examine the very limited way in which modern corporate governance 
theory interacts with major value systems operating in the 
environment, such as the financial system; systems of professional 
skills applied to assessment of the director’s duty of skill, care, and 
diligence; and the equitable considerations that trigger a case of unfair 
prejudice.  Part V will develop some workable structural couplings 
with which corporate governance can be fruitfully linked to networks 
of values that influence corporate actors within a firm.  Part VI will 
offer conclusions. 
II. COUPLING SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND CORPORATE LAW 
A. From Individual to Network: Rendering Corporate Law 
User-Friendly 
The company form is mostly used by families, the state, or 
political parties.  The typical rules of corporate governance do not 
expressly prohibit company officers from bringing into the company 
interests they hold from membership in alternative environmental 
value systems.  Motivations from such exterior sources are, however, 
essentially ignored unless they conflict with the perceived interest of 
the company or that of the shareholders qua investor (not as, say, a 
                                                                                                               
other board members.  Hong Kong Model Articles for Public Companies, arts. 33–34 (2013) 
http://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20131721/es22013172177.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DTL
-2JL8]. 
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family member or employee), in which case they are condemned.34  
This is not surprising because law as a whole centers greatly on 
creating and enforcing rights and duties of individuals.35  However, 
the corporation always operates as a group, even if only a minimal 
group of one physical and one legal person; at the other end of the 
spectrum, the group can become very large.36 
Moreover, corporations are vehicles through which to 
conduct business activity; they are not ends in themselves.  The law 
enabled the creation of corporations to facilitate the activity of groups 
of people for their interaction with the world.37  As the aggregation 
                                                                                                               
 34 There is a significant difference between corporate law traditions in the United 
Kingdom and the United States on this point.  Although the corporate law of the United 
States uniformly recognizes companies as separate entities, most states consider them to be 
somewhat porous when assigning duties, so that directors’ duties flow through the company 
employing the director to the shareholders behind it.  See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews 
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (ruling that in the event of an 
inevitable takeover, the director has a duty to achieve the best price for the shareholders).  In 
the U.K. tradition, the company’s status as an entity is applied with more doctrinal coherence, 
so that a director’s duties run to the company for which she serves as director and with which 
she has an employment contract.  See Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 172(1) (U.K.) 
[hereinafter Companies Act 2006] (adding a more porous element of “promote the success 
of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole” to the traditional formulation). 
 35 H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 269 (Paul Craig ed. 3rd ed. 2012) (stating “legal 
rights and duties are the point at which the law with its coercive resources respectively 
protects individual freedom and restricts it or confers on individuals or denies to them the 
power to avail themselves of the law’s coercive machinery.”). 
 36 The very name “company” (Gesellschaft, societé, societá, ) indicates a 
social aspect, an association creating an enclosed society with its own set of rules.  This 
aspect of companies is plainly visible from both historical and theoretical vantage points.  
The first companies chartered by the British crown operated as quasi-autonomous 
governments in colonies from North America to Asia.  See, e.g., Janet McLean, The 
Transnational Corporation in History: Lessons for Today? 79 IND. L.J. 363, 367–75 (2004) 
(discussing the early successes of the English East India Company and other overseas trading 
corporations).  From a conceptual perspective, German companies fall under the genus of 
club (Verein) or association.  Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has decided that corporations 
should enjoy a certain level of protection for their exercise of political and religious rights.  
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  However, neither decision delves into the nature of the 
company in a rigorous way. 
 37 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Originalist or Original: The 
Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 877, 891–99 (2016) (arguing that a corporation is a collection of many individuals, 
united into one body, with the capacity of acting particularly of taking and granting property, 
of contracting obligations, and of suing and being sued, of enjoying privileges and 
immunities in common, and of exercising a variety of political rights, according to the design 
of its institution, or the powers conferred upon it). 
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of capital was a central function of the corporation, corporate law 
does recognize the authority of the financial system as a network of 
values beyond corporate law that may legitimately affect the 
company.38  The interest of an investor is only very rarely understood 
to be in conflict with the interest of the company.  Exceptions are also 
made for networks of values created in professions related to the 
decision-making of corporate officers, such as accounting, risk 
management, or business planning.  The values espoused in these 
professional cultures are both used by courts to flesh out the skill, 
care and diligence duty applied to company directors and can also 
define the interest of the company.39  Excluded value systems like the 
family are acknowledged primarily in the form of rules, checking 
motivations that might derive from them.  This is accomplished by 
prohibiting or requiring disclosure and sanitation of individual 
decisions taken under the influence of such systems.  The 
motivational assumption running in the background of modern 
corporate governance theory is that an individual profit motive 
aligned with that of the company should drive the interests of 
company participants.40 
                                                                                                               
 38 The key needs of the financial system are built into stock corporations: the 
transferability of shares makes a liquid investment possible, corporate personality with 
limited liability reduces the volatility of a company’s value even when its ownership changes 
through the trading of its shares, and the rules of corporate governance are designed to make 
risk manageable, placing great stress on protecting minority shareholders (who are financial 
investors) and creditors.  See infra Part IV, Section A.2. 
 39 The manner in which these exterior value systems are brought into corporate law is 
examined in Part IV, Section A.  
 40 This aspect of corporate law is so self-evident that it is rarely called out.  However, 
an examination of law shows it is true of motivations whether they are viewed in a positive 
or a negative light by corporate law.  In regulating conflicts of interest, Delaware General 
Corporation Law (DGCL) § 144 refers to a “director’s or officer’s [individual] relationship 
or interest,” and when specifying standing to demand a fair price for shares in connection 
with a corporate combination this law refers to “any [individual] stockholder of a 
corporation.”  Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 144, 262 (2013) [hereinafter DGCL].  Companies 
Act 2006 § 175(1) also refers to the individual director: “he has, or can have, a direct or 
indirect interest that conflicts” with that of the company.  Companies Act 2006, supra note 
34, § 175(1).  Although the right to petition for relief against unfairly prejudicial action refers 
to the members generally, it is the individual rights of each member that are indicated (“the 
company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial 
to the interests of members generally or of some part of its members”).  Companies Act 2006, 
supra note 34, § 994(1)(a).  Although German law does refer to the management board 
(vorstand) as a collective (Aktiengesetz [Stock Corporation Act] § 76–77), it still deals with 
interests of individuals, such as in the noncompetition requirement expressed in § 88, the 
duty of care expressed in § 91, and the annual decision to approve behavior (entlasten) 
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The result of this framework is that modern governance rules 
seek to hold the self-interests of corporate actors in check when they 
conflict with an operation of the company that is conceived to reap 
profit (whether immediately or through a visible causal chain).  
Through the work of Jensen and Meckling, efforts spent to control 
divergences between individual interest and the company’s (or 
shareholders’) interest are understood under the concept of “agency 
costs.”41  During most of the 20th century, the work of Berle and 
Means led scholars to focus on an agency problem between 
shareholders and the self-interested control of management.42  At 
least since the 1990s, it has been generally known that the “Berle & 
Means corporation,” defined by the characteristic of central 
management dominating dispersed shareholders, is not the global 
norm.43  During the 2000s, Kraakman et al. consolidated the theory 
of agency costs across the varying ownership structures found in 
major world economies, formulating a highly authoritative 
contemporary theory of comparative corporate law.44 
                                                                                                               
expressed in § 120. Aktiengesetz [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBl at 1089, as 
amended, § 76, § 77, § 88, § 91, § 120 (Ger.). 
 41 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–09 (1976). 
 42 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 84 (1932).  On the question of dispersed shareholding, see, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson 
& Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and 
Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013) (arguing that equity 
ownership in the United States no longer reflects the dispersed share ownership of the 
canonical Berle-Means firm and explaining the reason of the reconcentration of ownership 
in the hands of institutional investment intermediaries, which gives rise to “the agency costs 
of agency capitalism.”); Brian R. Cheffins and John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future 
of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51 (2011) (explaining the rise of 
hedge funds as practitioners of offensive shareholder activism); John C. Coffee Jr., The Rise 
of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership 
and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 37–39 (2001) (arguing NYSE’s role of guardian of the public 
investor, and it imposed high listing standards for its own self-interested reasons and tracking 
how NYSE became identified with mandatory listing conditions that protected “shareholder 
democracy” and prevented the separation of cash flow rights from voting rights.). 
 43 As was noted in a well-known study published in 1999, “If we look at the largest 
firms in the world and use a very tough definition of control, dispersed ownership is about 
as common as family control.  But if we move from there to medium-sized firms, to a more 
lenient definition of control, and to countries with poor investor protection, widely held firms 
become an exception.  Berle and Means have created an accurate image of ownership of 
large American corporations, but it is far from a universal image.”  La Porta et al., supra 
note 11, at 498. 
 44 KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 35–37. 
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This theory shows how the agency costs dynamic can be 
applied robustly to the relationship resulting from any kind of 
delegated authority, 45  including that between directors and the 
company (or shareholders), between controlling and minority 
shareholders (power delegated by means of the majority control rule), 
or between shareholders and creditors (power delegated by the fact 
that creditors remain corporate outsiders despite providing the 
company with cash).46  In each case, governance rules are designed 
to mitigate the risks from a situation in which an agent constituent 
might try to serve his or her own self-interest to the detriment of the 
principal constituent, which may or may not be the company itself.  
Self-interest extends to interests of members within a value system, 
typically the family but also a related firm, to which the relevant 
corporate actor is also connected. 
Differing political goals written into corporate law and 
differing socioeconomic circumstances can lead to different 
behavioral goals being ascribed to corporate actors.47  For example, 
if it is decided that the purpose of a company is to maximize profits 
for the benefit of shareholders, then power can be given to 
shareholders and competing interests are restricted.48  On the other 
                                                                                                               
 45 As Jensen and Meckling noted in 1976, “agency costs arise in any situation involving 
cooperative effort (such as the co-authoring of this paper) by two or more people even though 
there is no clear-cut principal-agent relationship.”  Jensen & Meckling, supra note 41, at 309. 
 46 KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 37–53. 
 47 Proving this point has been a central focus of the comparative corporate law work of 
Mark Roe.  See ROE, supra note 1, at 3–5 (aiming to find a deep, important and missing 
political explanation for the rise of the large firm and the separation of ownership from 
control).  Another important contribution on this topic is CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA 
PISTOR, LAW & CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD (2008) (“We . . . use corporate governance 
as a lens through which to view a much larger set of institutional phenomena in a given 
country and to analyze, as rigorously as possible, the relation between the legal system and 
the portion of the economic system that is directly related to firms’ structures and 
governance.”). 
 48 Profit maximization for the benefit of shareholders is an object found strongly 
represented in the “nexus of contracts” theory of corporate law.  See, e.g., FRANK 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 91 (1991) 
(“[T]he corporate contract makes managers the agents of the equity investors but does not 
specify the agents’ duties. To make such an arrangement palatable to investors, managers 
must pledge their careful and honest services.”).  The applicability of this understanding to 
Delaware law has recently been convincingly reaffirmed.  See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers 
of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability 
Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
2016] CONCEIVING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 105 
 
hand, if the object of a company is to thrive generally as an 
“undertaking,” power can be distributed among key corporate 
constituencies and shareholder primacy restricted.49  If we eventually 
join the very peculiar view of the U.S. Supreme Court that conceives 
the corporation as a person enjoying the same protection as any other 
person—free of prejudice arising from the fact that it can be called 
artificial—civil and human rights can be attributed to the company.50  
The only limits to this exercise are those provided by the political 
climate and respect for the internal coherence of legal doctrine.  These 
allocations of rights to privileged constituencies will be created by 
assigning duties to other corporate actors to respect such rights.  Thus, 
law ascribes duties to members of the board of directors and 
controlling shareholders in connection with the power they receive 
over the company from corporate law arrangements.51  Duties of care 
                                                                                                               
761 (2015) (examining the argument that directors have no legal obligation to make the 
promotion of stockholder welfare their end under Delaware law). 
 49 Pursuant to § 76(1) of the German Stock Corporation Act, the managing directors 
have a duty to manage the company, “in the interest of the undertaking” (interesse des 
unternehmens or unternehmensinteresse), which is understood as constituted by a pool of 
interests from shareholders, employees, creditors and the community.  HANS-JOACHIM 
MERTENS & ANDREAS CAHN, KÖLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ, § 76, at 33–37 (3rd 
ed. 2010).  This aggregated undertaking theory also underlines that the company ‘in itself’ 
is not seen as having an interest.  FRIEDRICH KÜBLER & HEINZ-DIETER ASSMANN, 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT: DIE PRIVATRECHTLICHEN ORDNUNGSSTRUKTUREN UND 
REGELUNGSPROBLEME VON VERBÄNDEN UND UNTERNEHMEN 178 (2006).  The view of the 
company as an arrangement that serves and mediates the interests of a number of 
constituencies is also found in the United States, under the corporatism model promoted in 
the 1950s and in the “team production” model promoted in the late 1990s by Blair and Stout.  
Cheffins presents an excellent history of ideas analysis of the evolving views of the 
corporation in the United States.  See Brian R. Cheffins, The Team Production Model as a 
Paradigm, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 397 (2015) (drawing upon key corporate law theories and 
trends to offer insights concerning their model and showing team production theory is 
unlikely to achieve paradigmatic status within the realm of corporate law theory). 
 50 This is a potential direction the U.S. Supreme Court is moving when it declares that 
“the Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity.”  
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). The German constitution 
takes a similar view. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [Basic 
Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 19(3) [hereinafter GRUNDGESETZ]. 
 51 Although not identical to the duties assigned to a trustee, the underlying structure is 
the same, and the duties reflect the legitimate claims of the persons who should benefit from 
the agent’s action.  See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 
55 VAND. L. REV. 1399 (2002) (crafting a unified theory of fiduciary duty, in which fiduciary 
relationships form when one party (the fiduciary) acts on behalf of another party (the 
beneficiary), where the “on behalf of” requirement describes relationships in which one 
person acts primarily for the benefit of another). 
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and loyalty serve to bend directors’ potentially self-serving behavior 
toward the diligent and faithful management of the company for the 
benefit of the entity or its constituents. 
In this way, comparative corporate scholarship has brought us 
to the point where governance mechanisms can be adjusted both to 
different manifestations of agency problems and to variations of 
corporate purposes, whether for profit maximization of shareholders 
or the benefit of a broader association of corporate constituencies.  
Despite this versatility, corporate governance generally presupposes 
that the moving force within a corporation is the individual profit 
incentive, whether in the form of executive compensation, capital 
gains and dividends, reliable payment of interest and principal, an 
enduring and fairly compensated employment relationship, or stable 
contracts of supply.  Governance mechanisms are designed to allow 
profitable operation of the entity as a unit while safely channeling the 
individual actors’ drives for self-gain, with each actor exercising 
delegated power on behalf of the entire company or another 
constituency.  Declaring motivations other than profit is not entirely 
foreign to corporations, as the “mission statements” of many 
companies evince, 52  but they are cosmetically added to the 
governance framework, not made integral to its operation.  When the 
interaction of shareholders and executive managers is largely 
determined by values from an environmental system of values they 
share and they have taken recourse to the company form in order to 
                                                                                                               
 52 The year before Volkswagen AG was embroiled in what was perhaps history’s most 
innovative premeditated fraud of environmental regulation, its Chairman proudly (or 
cryptically) announced in the company’s annual report that, “[o]ur pursuit of innovation and 
perfection and our responsible approach will help to make us the world’s leading automaker 
by 2018—both economically and ecologically.”  VOLKSWAGEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2014).  At the height of a period—as it was later determined by courts—
in which Volkswagen bribed its board labor representatives with extravagant parties and 
prostitutes to obtain their support for management initiatives, its Chairman wrote proudly 
(or cryptically) under the heading “Group Values,” that “the art of good leadership is to give 
employees yardsticks by which they can measure the soundness of their own decisions, and 
to urge them to make use of that freedom.”  VOLKSWAGEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT ANNUAL 
REPORT 14 (2003).  The criminal proceedings on the first set of charges were concluded in 
January 25, 2007 with the decision of the District Court of Braunschweig, 6th Criminal 
Chamber (docket no. 48/06).  For details on the scandal in English, see Dietmar Hawranek 
et al., Scandal at Volkswagen: With Prostitutes and Shady Executives, There’s No Love Left 
in this Bug, DER SPIEGEL ONLINE (July 18, 2005), http://www.spiegel.de/international/
spiegel/scandal-at-volkswagen-with-prostitutes-and-shady-executives-there-s-no-love-left-
in-this-bug-a-365752.html [https://perma.cc/JU3Y-YVJH]. 
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carry out ends grounded in such system, ignoring this fact renders 
corporate law defective and ill-suited to its task. 
B. Systems Theory Provides the Necessary Coupling Concepts 
When the law governing the most important organizational 
form in business ignores the most prominent societal value systems 
that use such a form, there is a serious gap between law and reality.  
The abstraction presupposed in law pulls individuals out of their 
environment—a system of values that may have the shape of their 
activity later brought into the corporate form.  Although this system 
of values may be the primary determinant of how corporate actors 
relate to each other, corporate law will either ignore the actor’s 
relationship to this network or condemn it as a source of conflicted 
interest.  To correct this situation, the process of abstraction must be 
reversed so that the individual corporate actor can be understood 
within both the corporation and the concrete matrix of motivations 
that place the actor in the corporation.  This can be done by shifting 
from law’s traditional focus on the individual to an analysis of 
systematic relationships.  Concepts borrowed from systems theory as 
applied to law provide a workable bridge for this transition. 
Systems theory has been used for decades to study the 
operation of family businesses.53  Deakin and Carvalho have also 
mapped out a system theoretic approach to company law that is 
wholly complementary to institutional studies, employing the 
theoretical framework developed by Niklas Luhmann.54  In an early 
work on systems theory, Luhmann explains why a successful 
governance analysis must look beyond individual conflicts of interest 
to the action of alternative motivational matrices: 
Classical organization theory contains many problems 
and tends to attribute the fault for this to individuals, 
particularly members of organizations condemned of 
                                                                                                               
 53 See Trevor Hopper & Andrew Powell, Making Sense of Research into the 
Organizational and Social Aspects of Management Accounting: A Review of Its Underlying 
Assumptions, 22 J. MGMT. STUD. 429 (1985) (providing an initial survey of the use of 
systems theory for the study of family firms in management studies). 
 54 Simon Deakin & Fabio Carvalho, System and Evolution in Corporate Governance, 
at 7–8, (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Law, Working Paper No. 150/2010) http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1581746 [https://perma.cc/UZ9Q-V6T9]. 
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not disclosing conflicts of role (duties).  In this way, 
problems deriving from the relationship between the 
system and its environment are written off to 
weakness of character.55 
While corporate law theory is built upon addressing conflicts 
of interest, it has never set out to confront entire systems of values 
and motivations arising from networks within society as they 
intersect with the corporation. 
In his later work, Luhmann revisited this problem, and 
borrowed concepts from biology to conceive portals between the 
systems of law and society in the form of “structural couplings,” 
which he distinguishes from “operative couplings,” with the former 
being constant and the latter event-specific. 56   In an operative 
coupling, a given event in one system impacts and takes on value in 
another system (e.g., a transfer of money extinguishes an obligation), 
while in a structural coupling, “a system continuously presupposes 
specific characteristics in its environment and structurally depends 
upon them” (e.g., using money to settle debts presupposes the legal 
nature of money). 57   Structural couplings serve as enduring and 
selective portals between systems because they “limit and in this way 
facilitate environmental influences on the system,” 58  like the 
membrane of a cell that absorbs only ions that are beneficial for the 
cell’s development and rejects all others as unneeded or damaging.   
Luhmann understands the legal concept of “property” as an 
essential coupling between the systems of “economy” and “law” 
because property “eliminates the need for consensus” in dealing with 
the social object, so “for the consequences of certain actions the 
owner’s consent alone is sufficient.”59  In this way, Luhmann agrees 
with other prominent theorists in understanding the definition of 
property rights as a component of transaction costs,60 but his focus is 
                                                                                                               
 55 NIKLAS LUHMANN, ZWECKBEGRIFF UND SYSTEMRATIONALITÄT 73–74 (Suhrkamp 
Verlag ed., 6th ed. 1999) (author’s translation). 
 56 LUHMANN, supra note 25, at 441. 
 57 Id. (author’s translation). 
 58 Id. (author’s translation, emphasis added). 
 59 Id. (author’s translation, italics omitted). 
 60 See, e.g., DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
28 (1990) (“The total costs of production consist of the resource inputs of land, labor, and 
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on the manner in which the link is channeled rather than its value to 
the economic system. 
Luhmann explains the manner of communication between 
systems through analogy to the “irritations” and “surprises” an 
organism might experience in its environment.61  When the social 
system “irritates” the legal system through a “surprise” that the legal 
system is designed generally (though not specifically) to foresee, law 
will not respond automatically—transforming  input to output—but  
instead process this irritation according to its own internal rules.62  
Both the social system and the legal system will “simultaneously” 
register the irritation, but there will be a lag time in the law’s reaction 
to the stimulus processing of the “surprise,” so that the two systems 
are not “synchronized.” 63   Whether the legal and social systems 
eventually line up with each other will determine the presence or 
absence of “corruption”: 
All conceivable pressures deform law, whether they 
ignore it and circumvent the applicable law or whether 
they cause the system case by case to call the legal 
illegal or the illegal legal.  Without structural 
couplings in the relationship between subsystems of 
society, law remains corrupt, in the modern sense of 
the word . . . . The more fundamental question is, 
rather, which structural couplings in relation to other 
subsystems can make it possible for corruption to be 
displaced and simultaneously environmental 
influences to be reduced and—aided by the 
coupling—increased.64 
                                                                                                               
capital . . . and in transacting—defining, protecting, and enforcing the property rights to 
goods”). 
 61 LUHMANN, supra note 25, at 442.  
 62 Id. at 442, 453.  The manner in which systems interact, but stabilize themselves 
internally is made evident in Luhmann’s conceptual definition of rule of law.  While the 
legal enforceability of a transfer of money has a real importance in the economy, it must be 
something “that cannot be paid for” (unbezahlbar), so that the two systems communicate but 
remain independent (author’s translation, italics omitted). 
 63 Id. at 442. 
 64 Id. at 445. 
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The corruption that occurs when law and society are out of 
sync is corrected by structural couplings that allow the two systems 
to communicate, so that the social activity creating the irritation can 
adjust law.  Imagine an arrangement where A takes control of B’s 
property with B’s consent but without purchasing title to it, and 
behaves openly as the property’s owner, transferring to B the fruits 
earned from the property.  This apparent corruption of the ownership 
relationship can be repaired through either the property law concept 
of “trust” or the contract law concept of “agency,” both of which 
would have specific constitutive elements that facilitate and limit 
their use. 
As discussed in the previous section, no structural coupling 
has been designed to allow those major value networks (such as 
family or state) that use the corporate form to communicate 
effectively with corporate law and eliminate the corruption which 
occurs in both the social systems and corporate law when the two 
systems interact.  On the contrary, corporate law has created rules on 
conflict of interest that are triggered if an individual corporate actor 
belongs to a family in which another member is dealing with the 
company through that actor.  Neither the aim of the secondary system 
nor the corporate actor’s duty to it are understood as relevant to the 
conflict of interest analysis.65  Preventing influence by such value 
systems is considered a best-practice stopgap against evasion, 
undertaken to protect the interests of outside investors so they can 
place funds into a company without fear of abuse by insiders.66  The 
absence of a workable coupling between the systems that control 
most companies and the law according to which these companies 
operate appears to be a choice that has been made in favor of 
designing the company for insertion into the financial market despite 
most companies’ actual needs. 67   The securities market requires 
                                                                                                               
 65 The Hong Kong Companies Ordinance brings family relationship in at a number of 
points to attribute the interests of family members to the corporate actor.  Hong Kong 
Companies Ordinance, (2014) Cap. 622, §§ 281, 486, 667, 674) (H.K.) [hereinafter HKCO].  
 66 The ability to attract such outside investors is then ultimately enshrined as a key 
element of economic development.  See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of 
External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1149 (1997). 
 67 The costs of external finance were clearly explained as early as Stewart C. Meyers, 
The Capital Structure Puzzle, 39 J. FIN. 575, 581 (1984).  A recent view, apparently based 
on insights from the official study of the U.K. equity markets which John Kay led, can be 
found in JOHN KAY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE OR SERVANTS OF 
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fungible units of value that can be traded knowing that their issuer 
has a single purpose fungible to other issuers to act in such a way that 
these units of value increase in price.  The decision to conceive the 
corporation as a financialized entity forms the basis for much of 
traditional corporate governance scholarship.68 
III. TWO COMMON VALUE NETWORKS THAT USE THE 
CORPORATION: FAMILY AND THE STATE 
A. Family Firms: Loyalty Transcending Contract 
Of the value networks in the social environment that might 
co-exist with a company, perhaps the most common is the family.69  
Family firms70 are widespread, if not dominant, in most economies.  
The Family Firm Institute (FFI) gathers data from a number of 
sources (including Harvard Business School and KPMG) to provide 
the following estimates on the portion of economic activity 
represented by family firms: 
 
                                                                                                               
THE PEOPLE? (2015) (“Stock markets are not a way of putting money into companies, but a 
means of taking it out . . . . While railways, car manufacturers and brewers needed additional 
funds to build new plant as they expanded, new companies today—such as Apple or 
Google—commonly become generators of cash, rather than users, early in their lifetime.”). 
 68 See supra discussion in Part IV, Section A.2. 
 69 A potential competitor for this title might be the corporate group.  If simple groups 
are included, such constellations of companies are indeed common.  Corporate groups also 
can have an overall purpose that has systemic value and cannot be boiled down to a single 
group company.  Because the members of the group are individual companies, however, it 
differs from the kind of system under analysis in this paper, where members of the (family 
or state) system are also corporate actors with specific duties.  Nevertheless, it is worth 
undertaking a parallel systemic analysis for the special ways in which groups make use of 
the corporate form.  See, e.g., the extensive treatment of these questions in PHILLIP I. 
BLUMBERG ET AL., BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS (2d ed. 2004). 
 70 The definition of “family firm” varies among scholars and jurisdictions, but generally 
includes elements of both family control and family management.  In this paper, the concept 
of family firm used accommodates the varying specifics of different definitions and 
corresponds to the recent observations of the European Economic and Social Committee:  
“It is generally accepted that family businesses can be characterized within three circles: 
families, businesses and ownership structure.  The impact of the family on the other two 
circles determines the family nature of the company.  This impact means that family 
businesses are more complex than their non-family counterparts.”  See, e.g., EUROPEAN 
ECON. AND SOC. COMM., FAMILY BUSINESSES IN EUROPE AS A SOURCE OF RENEWED GROWTH 
AND BETTER JOBS (2015), http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.int-opinions.34702 
[https://perma.cc/U58M-FY5N]. 
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 In the United States, at least half of all 
companies and just over half of listed 
companies; 
 In Europe, approximately 60% of all 
companies; 
 In China, approximately 85.4% of private 
sector enterprises; and 
 In India, approximately 79% of organized 
private sector employment.71 
 
As the oldest and most prevalent social organization, the 
family has its own organizational logic.  Hirschman, in Exit, Voice 
and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and 
States, uses family as his primary example of an organization where 
there is a high degree of loyalty. 72   Because the family is an 
organization in which socialization begins at birth and continues (at 
least nominally) until death, it has the potential to exhibit an intense 
unity that far outstrips that arising from ad hoc employment positions 
or membership stakes in a stock corporation.  This characteristic is 
evident in firms of all dimensions, from the neighborhood restaurant 
to family empires like that of the Rothschild73 or Walton families.74 
This systemic logic of the family as an organization gives 
family firms certain recurring characteristics.  These include 
                                                                                                               
 71  Global Data Points, FAM. FIRM INST., http://www.ffi.org/?page=GlobalDataPoints 
[https://perma.cc/CF89-K2JB] (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).  When compiling this data, FFI 
uses the definition formulated by Miller et al.: “Family Firm[s] [are those] in which multiple 
members of the same family are involved as major owners or managers, either 
contemporaneously or over time.”  Danny Miller et al., Are Family Firms Really Superior 
Performers?, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 829, 836 (2007).  See also Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth 
of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1377 (2009); International 
Family Enterprise Research Academy, Family Businesses Dominate, 16 FAM. BUS. REV. 235 
(2003) (providing further data that presents a stronger presence of family firms). 
 72 ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 77–78 (1970). 
 73 “[T]he history of the firm is inseparable from the history of the family: the phrase 
‘the House of Rothschild’, which has been used by previous historians (and film-makers) 
was used by contemporaries, including the Rothschilds themselves, to convey this unity.” 
NIALL FERGUSON, 1 THE HOUSE OF ROTHSCHILD: MONEY’S PROPHETS: 1798–1848 (1998). 
 74 There are too many differences between the rise of Rothschild banking in 19th 
century Europe and that of Walton retailing in 20th century America to achieve any more 
with this reference than a reminder that the family firm can take many different shapes yet 
retain its familiar nature. 
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generally recognized features, such as a pronounced drive for both 
longevity and autonomy of the firm,75 in which the effect of the 
family as an organization independent of and with a timeframe 
different from the company becomes visible as such.  The family 
itself will be as long-lived as its progeny and will remain genetically 
distinct, so that its presence within the company structure will tend to 
drag the corporation in the direction of these two characteristics.  
From a systemic point of view, longevity and autonomy are 
predictable characteristics of a company that contains a controlling 
family.  The particular characteristics of the family as an organization 
can also lead to another common trait of family firms, which is a 
concerted effort to preserve a specific culture, 76  something many 
non-family firms attempt to project as well. 
Other features of family firms are less well-recognized.  
Broad-based empirical studies of large firms have shown that founder 
controlled family firms significantly outperform non-family firms in 
terms of profitability, particularly when founders are heads of the 
board.77  Other studies, discussed below, show how the independent 
network of the family coexisting with the company’s governance 
framework supplements and supports management.  Looking at 
Chinese firms, Amit et al. found that when external institutions are 
poor, the presence of family ownership adds significant value to a 
                                                                                                               
 75 See, e.g., Thomas Markus Zellweger et al., From Longevity of Firms to 
Transgenerational Entrepreneurship of Families: Introducing Family Entrepreneurial 
Orientation, 25 FAM. BUS. REV. 136, 136–51 (2012); G.T. Lumpkin et al., Long-Term 
Orientation: Implications for the Entrepreneurial Orientation and Performance of Family 
Businesses, 22 ENTREPRENEURSHIP & REGIONAL DEV. 11–24 (2010); Timothy G. 
Habbershon et al., A Unified Systems Perspective of Family Firm Performance, 18 J. BUS. 
VENTURING 451, 452 (2003). 
 76 Bennedsen and Fan recount how the Mulliez family created an academy to train its 
family members for the business over a 100-year period, distilling the culture of the group’s 
founder and passing it on to family members to run the firm of some 175,000 employees. 
BENNEDSEN & FAN, supra note 12, at 2, 4. 
 77 See generally, Roberto Barontini & Lorenzo Caprio, The Effect of Family Control 
on Firm Value and Performance: Evidence from Continental Europe, 12 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 
689 (2006); Belen Villalonga & Raphael Amit, How Do Family Ownership, Control and 
Management Affect Firm Value? 80 J. FIN. ECON. 385 (2006); Ronald C. Anderson & David 
M. Reeb, Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500, 
58 J. FIN. 1301 (2003). 
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firm.78  From an institutional point of view, this is exactly what we 
would expect when a robust system like the family is used in a context 
that lacks other competent ordering systems.  Anderson et al. found 
that, “[b]ecause of the unique incentives generated by long-term 
commitments to the firm, undiversified portfolios, and familial 
pressure, founding families appear to reduce agency conflicts 
between the firm’s equity and debt claimants and thereby reduce the 
cost of debt financing.”79  Others have found empirical support for 
the arguments that family firms have more efficient channels for 
informal decision-making80 and overall lower transaction costs.81  All 
of these findings are consistent with an understanding that the family 
brings an existing system of relationships, communication, and trust 
into the mechanisms of corporate law and does not depend on the law 
for its own operational efficiency.  While this is partially recognized 
in the way current corporate governance treats family relationships as 
sources of interest conflicts, the systemic nature of the network is 
generally ignored. 
B. The Family Firm in Asia 
Although, as observed above, the family firm is prominent in 
all major economies, there are particular historical reasons why this 
form of business is particularly dominant in the private sectors of 
Asian economies.  Throughout history, Asia and the West have 
followed very different paths of development.  In Europe, the 
incubator of Western culture, the core cultural institution of 
Christianity weakened the extended family as a key social institution.  
Grief observes: 
This was achieved by such policies as prohibiting 
marriages among kin . . .  encouraging the donation of 
                                                                                                               
 78 Raphael H. Amit et al., The Role of Institutional Development in the Prevalence and 
Value of Family Firms (Harv. Bus. Sch. Fin., Working Paper No. 1507823, 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507823 [https://perma.cc/ZZ5R-SNJX]. 
 79 Ronald C. Anderson et al., Founding Family Ownership and the Agency Cost of Debt, 
68 J. FIN. ECON. 263, 283 (2003). 
 80 Catherine M. Daily & Marc J. Dollinger, An Empirical Examination of Ownership 
Structure in Family and Professionally Managed Firms, 5 FAM. BUS. REV. 117, 124 (1992). 
 81 Craig E. Aronoff & John L. Ward, Family-Owned Businesses: A Thing of the Past 
or a Model of the Future?, 8 FAM. BUS. REV. 121, 122–23 (1995). 
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one’s inheritance to the church, advocating consensual 
marriages, and condemning practices that enlarged the 
family, such as polygamy, divorce and remarriage. . . . 
By the late medieval period, kin-based social 
structures were no longer at the center of European 
institutional complexes.  The rise of alternative, non-
kin-based social structures in such forms as 
communes, guilds, fraternities, and universities is a 
hallmark of this time. . . . [T]he relative absence of 
both kin-based social structures and an effective state 
in late medieval Europe led the Europeans to 
progressively rely on corporations: non-kin-based, 
self-governed, interest-based social structures.82 
Grief offers detailed comparison of European and Muslim 
development and shows that “[c]ollectivist cultural beliefs were a 
focal point” in the culture of Muslim merchants, where kin-based 
organizations thrived.  In contrast, “individualistic cultural beliefs 
were a focal point among the [European] Genoese,”83 where non-kin-
based organizations thrived.  The individual, as the basic social unit, 
came to inhabit non-kin-based institutions, including the corporation, 
at various levels within society.84 
Like that of Muslim society, Asian history has differed 
markedly from the institutional history of Europe in stressing 
relationships over individuals.  Glenn explains: “East Asian 
tradition . . . did not generate a notion of individual rights . . . [there 
is a] refusal to conceptualize individuals in any other way than 
relational—as children, parents, friends . . . and on and on.”85  This 
state of affairs reflects the central teaching of Confucianism to focus 
                                                                                                               
 82 AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY 252 (2006) 
(citing JACK GOODY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY AND MARRIAGE IN EUROPE 135 
(1983) on the specific practices introduced.). 
 83 Id. at 281. 
 84 From his own conceptual perspective, Hegel describes how the members of a family 
whose business is inserted into a corporation overcome the limits of self and family in order 
to achieve a more honorable stance as member of the corporation.  However, like the family, 
the corporation ultimately inhibits the unmediated relationship between the individual and 
the civil society and state.  G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 271–273 
(Allen W. Wood ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991) (1820). 
 85 H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 337 (4th ed. 2010). 
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on the “Five Cardinal Relationships” (wu lun) in which filial piety is 
central. 86   Ruskola explains a difference in this regard on 
interpersonal bonds.  “[J]ust as contract is the paradigmatic form of 
private ordering in [the American] legal system today, so family was 
the ideological paradigm of traditional Chinese private ordering.”87  
The family remains the central social institution, even in countries 
that have experienced decades of communism, as the estimate that 
family firms constitute about 85% of the Chinese private sector 
business makes clear.88  Gatfield and Youseff go so far as to assert 
that the “popularity and commonality of the Chinese family-owned 
business is both an affront and a holistic challenge to the nature of the 
three-fold societal structure and individualistic economic capitalism 
of western modernity.”89  This particular assertion runs contrary to 
data showing that, as in the West, Asian family enterprises tend to 
outperform nonfamily firms, provided that control and cash-flow 
rights are in balance,90 i.e., control is not achieved through a pyramid 
structure or share classes allowing disproportionately low investment. 
It is also true that just as the family can buttress corporate 
governance and operations mechanisms, it can threaten them.  As a 
matter of system logic, it can be expected that when family integrity 
and dynamism are congruent with the requirements of a given stage 
of a given firm’s development, a family firm will be competitive.  For 
the same reason, if the motivations generated within a family were to 
deviate from the needs of the business because, e.g., the family 
system experiences a significant disruption, the family as secondary 
system would then drag on the efficiency of the company.  In Hong 
Kong, the Li family that controls Cheung Kong Holdings and 
                                                                                                               
 86 Seok-Choon Lew et al., Confucian Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism in Korea: The 
Significance of Filial Piety, 11 J. E. ASIAN STUD. 171, 175 (2011).  “No other culture or 
religion puts more meaning on family than Confucianism, because the Confucian family 
carries the religious meaning of eternal life.”  Id. at 179.  “Individuals exist as parts 
constituting the whole in the form of family—that is, as unity, not as independent units.”  Id. 
at 180. 
 87 Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and 
Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599, 1608 (2000). 
 88 FAM. FIRM INST., supra note 71. 
 89 Terry Gatfield & Mark Youseff, A Critical Examination of and Reflection on the 
Chinese Family Business Unit and the Chinese Business Clan, 14 FAM. BUS. REV. 153, 154 
(2001). 
 90 Stijn Claessens et al., Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large 
Shareholdings, 57 J. FIN. 2741, 2743 (2002). 
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Hutchison Whampoa is not known for displaying family discord.  The 
founder, Li Ka-shing, who turned eighty-nine in 2017, has focused 
considerable effort both on succession and the future of the family 
firms by rationalizing the corporate group.91  One of Li’s competitors 
in property development, the Sun Hung Kai Group, has been less 
fortunate in family affairs.  Following the death of its founder, Kwok 
Tak-seng, his three sons Walter, Raymond, and Thomas took over the 
company, but the oldest son was kidnapped and suffered trauma, 
affecting his management of the company in subsequent years.92  
When the younger brothers (perhaps prematurely) stepped in to fill 
the breach, at least one of them (Thomas) became involved in activity 
with a government official that in 2014 earned him and the 
government official prison sentences for bribery.93 
The trial of Thomas and Raymond Kwok for bribery brought 
two major Chinese value systems into contact.  The trial was not only 
the first of its kind in Hong Kong but was launched in the same year 
that mainland China’s anti-corruption drive began.94  It is impossible 
to say that this highly unusual action against one of Hong Kong’s 
wealthiest families was in no way related to events set in motion by 
the CCP in mainland China.  Indeed, there has been some further 
friction between the state and a prominent family.  In 2015, Li Ka-
shing was publicly criticized by a CCP publication for divesting from 
                                                                                                               
 91 See (1) Cheung Kong Reorganisation Proposal—Change of the Holding Company 
of the Cheung Kong Group from Cheung Kong to CKH Holdings by way of a Scheme of 
Arrangement, (2) Merger Proposal—(a) Proposed Acquisition by the Hutchison Group of 
6.24% of the Common Shares of Husky in issue and (b) Proposed Share Exchange Offer to 
the Hutchison Scheme Shareholders for the Cancellation of all the Hutchison Scheme Shares 
by way of a Scheme of Arrangement, and (3) Spin-off Proposal—Proposed Spin-off and 
Separate Listing of the Property Businesses of the CKH Holdings Group on the Stock 
Exchange by way of Introduction (Jan., 9 2015).  HKEXNEWS, http://www.hkexnews.hk/ 
(last visited June 30, 2016). 
 92 JOE STUDWELL, ASIAN GODFATHERS: MONEY AND POWER IN HONG KONG AND 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 264 (2007). 
 93 See, e.g., Stuart Lau, Rafael Hui and Thomas Kwok Found Guilty of Bribery in Hong 
Kong’s Biggest Graft Trial, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 19, 2014), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1665519/rafael-hui-and-thomas-kwok-
found-guilty-bribery-hong-kongs-biggest [https://perma.cc/JW74-5YL3]. 
 94 Brian Spegele, China Anticorruption Cases Have Quadrupled Since 2013, Study 
Says, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/12/11/china-
anticorruption-cases-have-quadrupled-since-2013-study-says [https://perma.cc/4XTR-
M4SB]. 
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China and reorganizing his group under Cayman Islands law.95  There 
are certainly historical reasons why the CCP might find itself in 
arguments with powerful bourgeoisie families, 96  but today the 
structural arguments might be more powerful.  Both families and the 
CCP bring an external system of operations into a corporation whose 
governance is designed to coordinate individuals divorced from such 
systems.  These two value systems are present in the controlling 
shareholders of nearly every major company in China (including 
Hong Kong).  For this reason, among others, the CCP will be the other 
major social system examined in this paper. 
C. Party Firms: Ideology and Ambition Transcending the 
Immediate Profit Motive 
Ruskola has observed that in China there are express 
conceptual links between what society expects from extended 
families and what it expects from the CCP.97  Today, most of the 
largest Chinese corporations are owned by the People’s Republic of 
China and controlled by the CCP, which directly controls the 
appointment of senior management and indirectly controls their 
policy choices for the company.98  These firms are some of the largest 
in the world. 99   Like a family, a political party is not organized 
                                                                                                               
 95 Bruce Einhorn, The Tycoon Left Out in the Cold: China Accuses a Billionaire of 
Forsaking the Fatherland, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-08/china-s-attack-on-li-ka-shing-spooks-hong-
kong-s-elite [https://perma.cc/6U3G-77UU]. 
 96 Beyond the historical animosity between the two groups, the CCP has recently begun 
a path similar to that of traditional corporate governance theory by viewing families as 
inherently suspect because their alternative network offers tunneling potential to extract 
benefits of control and transfer them to peripheral family members.  See, e.g., Simon Denyer 
& Xu Yangjing, China Vows to Tackle ‘Family Corruption’—But Even State Media Can’t 
Hide Its Skepticism, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/worldviews/wp/2016/04/29/china-vows-to-tackle-family-corruption-but-even-state-
media-cant-hide-its-skepticism [https://perma.cc/L8P2-W44Z]. 
 97 Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and 
Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599, 1608 (2000). 
 98 Jiangyu Wang, The Political Logic of Corporate Governance in China’s State-
Owned Enterprise 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 631, 651–660 (2014); Hon S. Chan, Cadre 
Personnel Management in China: The Nomenklatura System, 1990–1998, 179 CHINA Q. 703, 
704 (2004); MCGREGOR, supra note 11, at 67–69. 
 99 According to Fortune Magazine, in 2015 Chinese state owned enterprises ranked as 
follows on a global scale: State Grid (2nd in Global 500), China National Petroleum (3rd), 
Sinopec Group (4th), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (15th), China Construction 
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primarily to generate profits, and like a family, the roles, duties and 
motivations within the network of a political party will not 
necessarily be congruent with the scheme projected by corporate law.  
Unlike a family, political parties involved in such management 
activities are neither ancient (although they are long-standing) 
organizations of humanity nor seen by the majority of existing 
scholarship as having any positive impact on the company.  As will 
be discussed below, the relationship between the CCP and Chinese 
SOEs is generally seen as contradictory, but with a system-oriented 
theory of corporate law it need not be so. 
In China, the state is the ultimate owner of most of the 
country’s largest commercial, industrial and energy enterprises, with 
its holdings managed by the Chinese central government’s State-
Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Committee 
(SASAC).100  These enterprises currently exist as stock corporations, 
the result of a process of “corporatization” undertaken in the 1990s.101  
Although many of them are listed on stock exchanges in China and 
abroad, SASAC retains a controlling interest in these SOEs.  While 
the executive managers of such companies are duly appointed in 
conformance with shareholder vote under Chinese company law, 
decisions regarding the nominees for such positions are made by the 
CCP’s Central Personnel Committee, which MacGregor calls 
“without a doubt the largest and most powerful human resources body 
in the world.”102  As explained in the Joint Opinions on Strengthening 
and Improving Party Building Work in Central SOEs, the Central 
Personnel Committee must participate in “the appointment, 
management and supervision of all SOE officers above the middle 
level.”103  The Committee will examine the candidate’s qualifications 
and deliberate on their possible appointment, then “the appointment 
                                                                                                               
Bank (22nd), China State Construction Engineering (27th), Agricultural Bank of China 
(29th), Bank of China (35th), China Mobile Communications (45th).  Global 500, FORTUNE 
(Aug. 19, 2016), beta.fortune.com/global500 [https://perma.cc/25DT-XEFU]. 
 100 The list of firms held by SASAC.  SASAC, Yangqi Minglu ( ) [List of 
State-Owned Enterprises] (Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n86114/n86137/
index.html [https://perma.cc/SV94-UFLL]. 
 101 Wang, supra note 98, at 646 (noting that the project of corporatization was 
undertaken in tandem with the promulgation of China’s first Western-style companies act in 
the modern era).  See also WANG, supra note 30, at 6. 
 102 MCGREGOR, supra note 11, at 69. 
 103 Wang, supra note 98, at 658 (providing the translation used here on Joint Opinions 
on Strengthening and Improving Party Building Work in Central SOEs). 
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of the candidates by the board of directors [will take place] based on 
the recommendations of the Party Committee, following all legal 
procedures and formalities.”104  When CCP members are appointed 
to positions by a CCP screening committee, we must assume that 
Party principles will be an important determinant of the way that 
these appointees interact with each other and the company.  Like the 
family, the CCP presents a system defining interpersonal 
relationships, so that corporate actors will not meet the traditional 
expectation under corporate law of individually autonomous profit-
driven actors within the firm. 
Wang refers to this mix of CCP control and corporate 
formalities as “a system of corporate governance that features two 
parallel structures, one for legal governance and the other for political 
governance.”105  Wang argues that CCP policies are carried into the 
corporate behavior of the SOEs through four channels: (i) members 
of the CCP are required to follow party philosophy and policies; (ii) 
the CCP appoints party members to the executive management 
positions within the SOEs; (iii) party cell meetings are conducted 
regularly by SOE employees at various levels; and (iv) because the 
CCP has its own disciplinary channels for party members, these 
channels also apply to party member executives in SOEs. 106  
McGregor puts it more cryptically, citing a lawyer who advises 
Chinese state firms: “‘In corporate law, the boards [of Chinese state 
companies] can choose to disregard the Party’s advice.  As a fact of 
life, they cannot.’”107 
Viewed from the perspective of systems theory, one can see 
how the presence of the CCP within a corporation gives corporate 
actors dual roles and duties, so that one system intermingles with and 
influences the other.  The CCP has its own ideological position, and 
this does not always correspond to profit maximization or 
“shareholder value.”  Wang explains that within Chinese society, a 
key aspect of CCP legitimacy is providing economic stability and 
prosperity, and that the SOEs are a tool in this process through 
directing the use of economic resources, implementing industrial 
                                                                                                               
 104 Id. at 659. 
 105 Id. at 648. 
 106 Id. at 652. 
 107 MCGREGOR, supra note 11, at 49 (quoting a securities lawyer familiar with Chinese 
companies). 
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policy and even collaborating in Chinese foreign policy. 108   In 
following government policies, the SOE could be understood to carry 
out a very general form of socially targeted corporate sustainability, 
or corporate social responsibility (CSR).  McGregor sees this as a 
clear disadvantage: “Far from being driven solely by making a profit 
for shareholders, the Party had to act in accord with social ‘stability’ 
and national ‘macro-economic’ policies laid down by the 
government.” 109   He further notes, “[t]he corporate animal that 
emerged from the protracted and painful birth of China Inc. was a 
strange new beast . . . it was both commercial and communist at the 
same time.”110  Wang offers a concrete example of SOE behavior 
diverging from pure profit motive; following major earthquakes, 
SOEs have been called upon to “participate in the rescue efforts by 
providing services and materials”111 to quake victims. 
Such socially oriented philosophy has also led to atypical 
patterns in executive compensation.  Executive managers given stock 
options when an SOE prepared for an IPO often did so with an 
understanding within the CCP that the options were not to be 
exercised.  MacGregor notes that these executives were deprived of 
“huge windfalls” generated by rising stock prices, and quotes the 
dilemma as expressed by someone close to the situation: “‘These 
executives say, I have added value, so I should be rewarded,’ said a 
Chinese banker. ‘The Party says, you have added value because we 
put you there.’”112  This approach to executive compensation would 
be extremely rare in a Western company, but after the global financial 
crisis began in 2007, it has been an approach that is increasingly 
considered.113 
The “parallel structures” of corporate governance found in 
Chinese SOEs present “a new model of SOE governance that 
combines universal elements of corporate law with communist 
political institutions.”114  McGregor well sums up how this model 
                                                                                                               
 108 Wang, supra note 98, at 660, 661. 
 109 MCGREGOR, supra note 11, at 52. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Wang, supra note 98, at 663. 
 112 MCGREGOR, supra note 11, at 102. 
 113 See, e.g., Steven A. Bank et al., Executive Pay: What Worked? (UCLA School of 
Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 16-11), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2812349 [https://
perma.cc/DY6N-UVL6]. 
 114 Wang, supra note 98, at 667. 
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might be grasped by the international capital markets when he 
characterizes expressions of policy loyalty as cronyism, “timely 
genuflections at the feet of the Party by officials, and indicative of 
political loyalty and reliability, both essential to a career in public 
life.”115  Wang asks the more academic, and probably more pertinent, 
question as to whether “this experiment will be successful and 
sustainable.”116  There are some signs that history could be moving 
favorably in the Chinese direction.  The Western model of executive 
compensation has been shown to present significant problems.  
General support for creating a socially sustainable philosophy of 
company law is growing.  Western countries use tax law to encourage 
all individuals (including corporations) to participate in charitable 
activities such as disaster relief. 
When the systematic unity of a network of values—like that 
promoted by a political party—is incorporated into corporate law, the 
contradiction between maximizing individual profit and maximizing 
general systemic welfare (or merely executing a party platform) can 
be mitigated.  As will be explained in Part IV, lawmakers have been 
generous (and generally successful) in bringing the values of the 
financial system into the rules governing the corporate form.  Similar 
accommodations can be made for other systems of value, whether the 
family, a political party, or a philosophy of social values pursued by 
corporate founders. 
IV. ADJUSTING CORPORATE LAW WITH STRUCTURAL 
COUPLINGS 
A. How Current Corporate Law Flexibly Accounts for Its 
Environment 
1. Individuals Adhering to Rules Constituting a Single System 
What is possibly still the leading theory of the firm 
understands corporate law as establishing a framework within which 
individuals meet and transact through a “nexus of contracts” to create 
                                                                                                               
 115 MCGREGOR, supra note 11, at 67. 
 116 Wang, supra note 98, at 669. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
2016] CONCEIVING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 123 
 
their respective rights and duties. 117   While differing political 
positions argue that rights, duties and the benefits of corporate 
operations should be attributed differently among the various 
corporate constituents, neither law nor theory in the leading traditions 
of company law118 provide for wholesale interaction of alternative 
systems of value within the company.119  Persons with power under 
corporate law (usually directors, but also including controlling 
shareholders and executive management, depending on the 
jurisdiction) must act in the best interests of the company or some 
constituent thereof and avoid conflicts of interest.120  Such conflicts 
are expressed in terms of self-interest, which is extended to cover 
links to systems (such as other companies or the family) where an 
                                                                                                               
 117 “Indeed, one can see corporate law in general as effectively a delegation to the 
legislature and the courts of the continual reformation and reinterpretation, as circumstances 
and strategies change, of the indefinitely long-term relational contract among a corporation’s 
shareholders, managers, and creditors that is constituted by the corporation’s charter.”  
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Reflections on the End of History for Corporate Law, 
YALE L. & ECON. RES. NO. 449, Aug. 2011, at 14.  See also PALGRAVE-MACMILLAN, 
CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISE AND PROSPECTS (2012); Cheffins, 
supra note 49, at 13 (citing MARC T. MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE SHADOW OF 
THE STATE 62, 67 (2013)). 
 118 There are good arguments supporting the view that the German corporate law 
framework is already systemic in its view that duties run to the overall “enterprise” 
(Unternehmen).  See MERTENS & CAHN, supra note 49, §§ 76, 33, 37 (3rd ed. 2010).  Indeed, 
the relational value of rights is deeply imbedded in modern German law.  The German 
constitutional guarantee of property right, for example, is already systemic in its basis: 
“Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed . . . . Property entails obligations.  
Its use shall also serve the public good.”  GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Basic Law] art. 14. (Ger.), 
translation at https://www.bundestag.de/blob/284870/ce0d03414872b427e57fccb703634dc
d/basic_law-data.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DK4-MWVV]. 
 119 An argument can also be made that when Hansmann and Kraakman refer to “the 
political power of the various interest groups” vying for predominance within the corporate 
entity, they imply that each of these groups brings its systematic network of values into the 
fray.  Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 117, at 13.  Although this does give insight into 
the play of power and the reasons for influence enjoyed by any given corporate constituency, 
it does not examine the manner in which various elements of each value system interact.  As 
such, their theory does not focus on the interaction of systems within the corporate form. 
 120 In all major jurisdictions, directors must avoid or declare any interest that conflicts 
with that of the company.  With respect to directors, see, e.g., DGCL, supra note 40, § 143–
144,; Companies Act 2006, supra note 34, §§ 172–173, 145–177, 182; HKCO, supra note 
65, § 536 (H.K.); David Chien v. Francis Cheung, [2013] H.K.E.C. 896 (noting that with 
respect to controlling shareholders, the duty is found in the US jurisdictions.); Weinberger 
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Company, 460 P.2d 464 
(Cal. 1969). 
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interest can be found.121  These systems thus become visible only as 
a manifestation of an individual interest of a corporate actor 
influenced by them. Law acknowledges one system, the company 
itself.  Other networks of systematic value are not recognized as such, 
with a few exceptions.  When the conflict comes from a source 
beyond the individual corporate actor, it will be attributed to that actor 
if the type of relationship is deemed capable of channeling the 
interest.122  The remainder of the network through which the interest 
is channeled rarely falls within the contemplated coverage of 
corporate governance rules. 
2. The Exceptional Role of the Financial System 
The accommodations within corporate law to allow the 
company’s smooth connection to the financial system are pervasive 
and deeply embedded in the structure of the corporation as governed 
by law.  As such, these features need not be announced and are often 
                                                                                                               
 121 DGCL § 144 extends its rule on conflict of interests in company transactions to an 
interest held by, “any other corporation, partnership, association, or other organization in 
which 1 or more of its directors or officers, are directors or officers, or have a financial 
interest.”  DGCL, supra note 40, § 144.  Sections 175 and 177 of Companies Act 2006 also 
apply to conflicts of interest that are “indirect” although they do not refer to interests of a 
person that is “connected” with a director, where “connected” expressly includes family 
members.  Companies Act 2006, supra note 34, §§ 252–253.  For provisions regulating a 
company’s extension of credit to directors, Companies Act 2006 § 200 includes such 
connected persons, which encompasses family members.  Hong Kong company law is 
similar in this regard.  Its provisions regulating extension of credit to a director apply to loans 
to a “connected entity,” and these entities include nuclear family and persons cohabiting with 
the director.  HKCO, supra note 65, §§ 486, 500–503.  However, the realities of businesses—
such as banks and international firms providing expatriate employees with housing—are 
addressed in a detailed set of exceptions to the prohibition, which allow loans to be made in 
connection with ordinary business or employee housing schemes.  HKCO, supra note 65, § 
509 (exception for home loan), HKCO, supra note 65, § 510 (exception for leasing goods 
and land), HKCO, supra note 65, § 511 (exception for transaction entered into in ordinary 
course of business).  Such balancing of power, prohibition, and exception is exactly what we 
would expect, given that corporate law provides society with an artificial construct for the 
convenience of associated undertakings of entrepreneurs and investors.  The remaining 
question is then why the Ordinance does not provide a more articulated set of options for 
attributing interests between family members. 
 122 The law’s understanding of exactly what can channel an interest is far less 
substantiated than it could be.  Historically existing aggregations of common economic 
interest (family, company and partnership) are included automatically, while other 
aggregations long recognized in sociology and economics (club, class and school networks) 
would have to be alleged and proven.  Suspicion of political party influence is found in 
economics and corporate law scholarship, but not in the law itself. 
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taken for granted.  The stock corporation is conceived theoretically 
and organized legally as a means of concentrating the financial 
investments of many contributors into a single entity through public 
issue of shares in that entity. 123   In this way, corporations could 
expand their capital beyond a size achievable by a small group of 
wealthy partners.  The financial system, like other systems, has its 
own internal needs.  Members of this system interact to make 
payment transfers, allocate capital, manage financial affairs and 
provide tools to manage risk. 124   The capital allocation and risk 
management functions require a limit on volatility for the value of 
assets they trade, “liquidity” through the ability to transfer such assets 
with satisfactory immediacy to others, and a cap on the amount of 
uncertainty arising from the risk of fraud by market participants or 
issuers of securities.125  The legal form of the stock corporation was 
designed and has over the years been repeatedly adjusted to meet 
these needs. 
At the level of design, stock corporations have basic features 
recognized in most jurisdictions: legal personality, investor 
ownership, limited liability, transferable shares, and central 
management.126  Four of these characteristics are closely tied to the 
needs of secondary market trading in negotiable instruments, a 
market that is much older than even the early stock corporations.127  
Corporate shares are transferable by default, 128  and these shares 
                                                                                                               
 123 See, e.g., 1 PALMER’S COMPANY LAW § 1.1 (Geoffrey Morse ed., 2016); FRANKLIN 
A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATE LAW 19–34 (2d ed. 2010); PAUL DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES 
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 11 (8th ed. 2008); EILIS FERRAN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE LAW 3 (2008); ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 1–4 (1986); ADOLF 
A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
11–17 (revised ed. 1968); 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW 
OF CORPORATIONS § 2 (1931). 
 124 See Kay, supra note 67, at 203.  Other influential lists of main activities for the 
financial system have of course been created.  See, e.g., FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, 
COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 25–45 (2000); Ross Levine, Financial Development and 
Economic Growth: Views and Agenda, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 688, 717–720 (1997). 
 125 See, e.g., MERVYN KING, THE END OF ALCHEMY: MONEY, BANKING AND THE FUTURE 
OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 204–225 (Kindle ed. 2016). 
 126 See ANDREAS CAHN & DAVID C. DONALD, supra note 10, at 9–19 (containing a 
discussion of other sources). 
 127 FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE WHEELS OF COMMERCE 100–101 (1992). 
 128 The shares of “private” companies in the U.K. tradition cannot be freely offered to 
the public.  See, e.g., Companies Act 2006, supra note 34, § 755.  In Hong Kong, express 
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evidence ownership interests in a separate legal entity that in turn 
owns its own assets and whose ability to pay liabilities is not tied to 
the assets of individual owners, thus shielding the company from 
claims against its owners and the owners from claims against the 
company.129  This furthers the stability of the value of traded shares. 
Rules in connection with the fifth characteristic, central management, 
allow financial investors to protect themselves against the radical 
uncertainty arising from human behavior, such as fraud.130  These are 
the rules of which alternative systems such as families and the state 
habitually run afoul, but the rules are rarely breached when action is 
taken to protect financial actors because those actors are the intended 
beneficiaries of the rules.131 
Over the years, this basic company structure designed for 
complementarity with the needs of the financial system has been 
amended to augment such complementarity.  Action intermediated by 
duties and the threat of litigation was understood as an overly indirect 
and expensive way to insure that managers behave in a way that 
brings the best results to financial investors.  A solution offered was 
to bring the action of the financial system directly within the 
relationship between management and the company by making 
management themselves financial market investors. 132   Executive 
compensation was redesigned in the 1980s to compensate 
management with stock and stock options, aligning the interests of 
management and financial market investors. 133   Companies were 
correspondingly given the power to issue derivative products in the 
                                                                                                               
provisions must be included in the company’s articles of association restricting transfer of 
shares in such companies.  HKCO, supra note 65, § 11. 
 129 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1333 (2006). 
 130 This is the central “agency problem” discussed in corporate law theory.  See, e.g., 
KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 78–82. 
 131 The results of this structural characteristic in corporate law has been discussed from 
a different angle with significant effect in LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: 
HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 
(2012). 
 132 See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Give Me Equity or Give Me Death—The Role of 
Competition and Compensation in Building Silicon Valley (University of Maryland Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 2006-442006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=940022 [https://perma.
cc/2APT-GU5A]. 
 133 See Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation: A New View from 
a Long-Term Perspective, 1936–2005, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2099 (2010); Bank, Cheffins & 
Wells, supra note 113, at 8–9. 
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form of options on their own shares.  Other changes were made to 
facilitate financial investors to bid up the price of a company’s shares, 
turning control of an entire company into something that could be 
easily traded.134  This was done by introducing codes and laws—
formulated by or meeting the needs of financial investors—to prevent 
management from impeding a hostile takeover of the company.135 
Pagano points out that in Continental Europe, the presence of labor 
organizations and families as concentrated alternative networks 
within companies checked the evolution of the company toward an 
object of transfer on the financial markets.136 
Finance extends beyond equity investment.  In order to 
mediate between the needs of two types of financing parties, 
shareholders and creditors, shares are sold for a specific amount, with 
the payment remaining as capital in the company for the protection 
of creditors, and this share capital may not be paid out to shareholders 
as dividends.137  In company law following the U.K. tradition, a 
unique form of security interest called “charges” were developed in 
corporate law to protect secured lending, and these charges were 
given properties allowing them to fluidly self-adjust from “floating” 
to “fixed” through a process referred to as “crystallization,” which 
                                                                                                               
 134 Kay, supra note 67, at 840–854 (discussing Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the 
Market for Corporate Control, 73 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 110 (1965)).  On 
the interests backing the creation of takeover rules, see John Armour & David A. Skeel Jr., 
Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?: The Peculiar Divergence of US and 
UK Takeover Regulation , 95 GEORGETOWN L. J. 1727 (2007). 
 135 See The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, The Takeover Code, Rule 21 (2016) 
(U.K.). 
 136  “In the European case, case, the personality of the business corporation was saved 
from its “thingness” by its identification with the fate of the family dynasty and by the 
countervailing powers of the unions.” Ugo Pagano, Economic Things, Legal Persons and 
Hybrid Business Corporations 24–25 (Feb. 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
 137 A number of issues have arisen over the years in these two forms of investor 
protection.  One is the gradual elimination of the concept of “par value” in some jurisdictions, 
which is not seen as reducing the amount of share capital available for creditor protection.  
Another is the elimination of a required “minimum capital” in the United States, but not in 
Europe, and the debate on whether minimum capital does protect creditors.  A third 
adjustment of rules on sale of shares under value in connection with granting stock options 
for managers and other employees of the company.  See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. 
COFFEE JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 228–
230 (10th ed. 2010); BAYLESS MANNING & JAMES J., JR. HANKS, MANNING’S LEGAL CAPITAL 
(3rd ed. 1990). 
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enables a creditor instantly to scoop up the entire aggregate of an 
enterprise’s assets upon occurrence of a specified credit event.138 
Such rules restrict the freedom of the company to finance 
itself as opportunity arises and also can restrict its ability to comply 
with contractual obligations to constituents such as employees, but 
the restriction has been traditionally viewed as a source of freedom: 
any protection of the interests of financial investors is deemed 
fundamentally salubrious for the company’s development. 139  
Moreover, where the needs of the financial system advise exceptions 
to these rules, such exceptions are routinely implemented.  Thus, 
although using share capital to pay for new shares offered to new 
investors can be understood to damage both earlier investors (who 
made real capital contributions) and creditors (who do not want 
capital depleted through distributions to shareholders), the 
underwriting industry expects a fee for its service, so that offering a 
discount on an issue of shares to pay such fees can be understood as 
valuable.140  The pattern of reasoning used—facilitating the financial 
system’s connection to companies strengthens such companies—is 
dominant in corporate law policymaking, so paying the fee to 
financial actors is actually considered a savings rather than a 
transaction cost because the focus is placed on the funding gained 
rather than the fee paid.  We introduce significant modifications into 
corporate law to stimulate such access to finance despite the fact that 
a successful company might well finance itself cheaper and better 
through revenue from ongoing operations.141  Even when connection 
with the value system of the financial markets is not the best choice 
for a company, such companies still must operate within a basic 
structure that was designed to accommodate such connection. 
                                                                                                               
 138 See National Westminster Bank Plc v. Spectrum Plus Ltd., [2005] 2 A.C. (H.L.) 680. 
 139 The link between investor protection and corporate growth has been made by Rafael 
La Porta et al., supra note 66. 
 140 Companies Act 2006, supra note 34, § 553; HKCO, supra note 65, § 14. 
 141 See, e.g., Meyers, supra note 67; Kay, supra note 67.  Some distinction is already 
present in corporate law between the minority investor protection in listed or public 
companies and that in unlisted, private and closely held companies.  However, at least in 
U.K. and U.S. state corporate law statutes, there is no deeply embedded distinction in the 
nature of the corporate form for those that will seek outside financing and those that will not. 
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3. Equitable Duties are Doors to Alternative Value Systems 
When a court applies the duty of care to the action of a 
corporate director, deciding whether it was undertaken with 
“reasonable care, skill and diligence”142 or “on an informed basis, in 
good faith,”143 the court must necessarily draw values from systems 
in the social environment beyond law that determine the relationship 
of an actor to an action or a contracting party.  Moreover, in both the 
United Kingdom and Hong Kong, the company law expressly 
requires that a director exercise the “the general knowledge, skill and 
experience that the director has,”144 which requires an examination of 
skills brought from the environment into the company.  This has led 
to decisions that consider practices in industries such as the taxation 
of international trusts145 and the management of firms engaged in 
derivatives trading.146  In Delaware, the requirement that directors act 
“on an informed basis” is generally fulfilled if they are fully briefed 
by a financial institution in a way that meets industry standards.147  
Although the financial system may be the related set of values in the 
environment most commonly brought into corporate law to determine 
whether a duty has been fulfilled, there is no limit on the sets of skill 
and standards that could be injected into corporate law for such 
purposes. 
4. “Equitable Considerations” Are a First Step in Systemic 
Accommodation 
In Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, and a number of 
jurisdictions of the Commonwealth, law provides minority 
shareholders with a remedy if the affairs of the company have been 
                                                                                                               
 142 Companies Act 2006, supra note 34, § 174(2)(a); HKCO, supra note 65, §465(2)(a). 
 143 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (1984). 
 144 Companies Act 2006, supra note 34, § 174(2)(b); HKCO, supra note 65, §465(2)(b). 
 145 Norman v. Theodore Goddard, [1991] BCLC 1028 (U.K.). 
 146 Chintung Futures Ltd (in Liquidation) v. Arthur Lai Cheuk-Kwan [1994] 1 H.K.L.R. 
95. 
 147 In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A 2d 946 (1985), directors were found 
to have acted on an informed basis because “The board then received a presentation from 
Peter Sachs on behalf of Goldman Sachs & Co. (Goldman Sachs) and Dillon, Read & Co. 
(Dillon Read) discussing the bases for their opinions . . . show[ing] slides outlining the 
valuation techniques used by the financial advisors, and others, depicting recent business 
combinations in the oil and gas industry.” 
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conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the plaintiff shareholder 
(individually or as a class).148  The activity complained of is not 
“misconduct”—i.e., a breach of the law or a duty—but rather an 
action by persons controlling the company that contravenes some 
(spoken or unspoken) arrangement reached among members.149  This 
differs from the fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders under 
Delaware law 150  because it looks to the actual constellation of 
relationships within the company in order to understand whether such 
an arrangement exists.  While breaches of formal contractual 
arrangements are included in the sources of this action, the more 
common situation is where some course of dealings among the parties 
have created an understanding for which it is equitable to bar 
contravention of the arrangement.  These equitable considerations 
arise primarily in connection with understandings among family 
members and persons in a ‘quasi-partnership’ relationship.151  That is, 
they arise when shareholders have agreed that a second system of 
values will operate within the company parallel to the rules 
established by corporate law. 
A recent case in which violation of equitable considerations 
arising from a family relationship was found to trigger unfair 
prejudice shows how corporate law can be made to accommodate a 
second systems within its rules of governance.  In 2015, the Hong 
Kong Court of Final Appeals held that patterns of behavior among 
two brothers created equitable considerations supporting an action for 
unfair prejudice.152  A company’s founder built up an international 
corporate group from 1930 until 2004, when he died.  His two sons 
had worked with him for decades managing the group.  Following the 
father’s death, the younger son began skillfully to maneuver to 
exclude his brother and his brother’s offspring from management and 
other benefits of control, increasing distributions to himself, his heirs 
and companies they control.  All of this was legal.  The Court made 
clear, however, that the family relationship as it existed during the 
                                                                                                               
 148 Companies Act 2006, supra note 34, § 994; HKCO, supra note 65, § 724. 
 149 In re Saul D. Harrison & Sons Plc., [1995] 1 BCLC 14 (U.K.). 
 150 See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1114 (1994) 
(stating that a shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to a corporation only if it owns a majority 
interest in the corporation, or exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation). 
 151 O’Neill v. Phillips, [1999] 1 WLR 1092 (U.K.). 
 152 Yung Kee Holdings Ltd., FACV 4/2015 (C.F.A. Nov. 11, 2015) (Legal Reference 
System) (H.K.). 
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founder’s lifetime established an expectation that the older brother 
would be included in company decision-making regardless of his 
shareholdings, so that subsequent actions of the defendant brother 
unfairly prejudiced the plaintiff. 153   The values expressed in the 
family system created the framework that the court enforced through 
this action.  Corporate law could accommodate such secondary 
systems in other ways as well. 
B. Coupling the Users of Corporations into Corporate Law 
If expectations generated by the family as secondary system 
intersecting with corporate law can be used to ground a personal 
action against another shareholder in corporate law, there is no real 
structural impediment to bringing such systems more actively within 
the corporate law framework.  The notion of “equitable consideration” 
on which the unfair prejudice action is based can be understood as an 
existing “structural coupling” in corporate law between the legality 
established by the law and the patterns of behavior established by the 
family using the corporate form.  In the Yung Kee decision, discussed 
above, it is very unlikely that the court would have considered an 
increase in the company’s earnings per share as a mitigating 
circumstance to the prejudicial exclusion of the older brother from 
management.  Expanded use of such couplings would allow users of 
the corporate form whose motives are influenced by systems such as 
families or a political party to operate within the company without 
running afoul of its design generally privileging the individual profit 
motive and more specifically the needs of the financial investor.  The 
following paragraphs provide examples that remain more theoretical 
than practical in nature. 
1. Legitimizing Family Use of the Corporate Form 
As discussed in Part III, family firms are known to favor 
values such as autonomy, longevity and culture, and the family 
network brings with it properties like alternative channels of 
communication and agency bonding through relationships of loyalty.  
It is possible to couple such values into the governance structure of 
                                                                                                               
 153 Id. ¶¶ 54–56. 
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corporate law without major structural adjustments.  An amendment 
of the law to allow directors to incorporate such values into board 
decision-making could be formulated very much like a typical 
constituency protection provision.  The U.K. Companies Act contains 
the beginnings of such a provision, expressly allowing directors to 
take into account the interests of the likely consequences of any 
decision on “the interests of the company’s employees,” “the need to 
foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers 
and others,” and “the impact of the company’s operations on the 
community and the environment,” among other things.154  Although 
the first subsection subordinates such aims to promoting “the success 
of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole,” the second 
subsection allows a corporate purpose as stated in the articles of 
association to set out different goals.155  Such purposes could include 
any particular value or cluster of values held to be important by the 
family using the particular company.  In this way, a family member 
director could act to promote a family value without a conflict of 
interest just as a shareholder director may not act to promote the value 
of shares without fearing condemnation for conflict of interest. 
If values important to a family were incorporated expressly in 
the object of a company or in other provisions in the articles of 
association or incorporation, they would additionally have an 
affirmative (rather than just a protective) function, achieving 
somewhat broader accommodation of the family into the corporate 
form.  Hong Kong law gives the articles of association the force of a 
contract under seal among all members and the company,156 so that 
family aims and practices could be enforced by direct action against 
any member and any director (for failing to cause the company to 
comply).  A similar action is available against directors that act 
outside of the stated object of the company.157  Patterns of behavior 
existing in gaps between such express declarations but necessary to 
carry them out could then constitute equitable considerations on 
                                                                                                               
 154 Companies Act 2006, supra note 34, § 172(1). 
 155 Companies Act 2006, supra note 34, § 172(2) (“Where or to the extent that the 
purposes of the company consist of or include purposes other than the benefit of its members, 
subsection (1) has effect as if the reference to promoting the success of the company for the 
benefit of its members were to achieving those purposes”). 
 156 HKCO, supra note 65, § 86.  A provision with like effect is found in Companies Act 
2006, supra note 34, § 33. 
 157 HKCO, supra note 65, § 116(3). 
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which an action in unfair prejudice—or a specially devised action—
could be based. 
The adjustments discussed above to couple family and 
corporate form would allow significant progress in accepting the 
family as a legitimate user of the corporation.  Actions influenced by 
family aims would no longer constitute conflicts of interest, and thus 
would have achieved a status similar to the aims expressed in the 
financial system.  Like financial system imperatives, family aims 
could also be positively pursued and this pursuit would have an 
avenue of enforcement.  However, to reach the proper level of 
accommodation, the structure of governance should also be adjusted.  
Under Hong Kong law, the selection and tenure of company directors 
is provided for in the articles of association.  The law itself in most 
cases refers to “directors” rather than “board of directors” when 
defining their powers and duties.158  With this enabling framework, it 
should also be possible to constitute a supervisory board and 
management board dichotomy in the articles of association to manage 
the company.  The supervisory board could be selected from family 
members using any method these members see fit to incorporate into 
the articles and the management board could either be selected by the 
supervisory board or by a vote of all shareholders (including both 
family and non-family participants), or some other method.  The 
supervisory board would constitute a structural coupling between 
family decision-making and company management. 
In addition to accommodating a family network through 
adjustment of corporate purpose and organization of governance, the 
equitable fiduciary duty and duty of care should be open to 
adjustment.  This could be achieved through either statute or case law.  
The key to the inclusion of an alternative system like a family within 
the corporate form is that the relationship arising from the 
environmental system should be permitted to influence the behavior 
of corporate actors to the extent necessary for the internal operation 
                                                                                                               
 158  For example, a search of the HKCO shows only four uses of the term “board of 
directors,” each time referring to the power of a holding company to influence the board of 
its subsidiary.  By contrast, the nearly 400 other references to board action or acts by 
individual directors use the term “directors” or “director.”  For example, in ascribing the 
duty of informing shareholders of the state of the company before each annual general 
meeting, the law uses the phrase, a “company’s directors must prepare for each financial 
year a report.”  HKCO, supra note 65, § 388.  
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of the relevant system.  Values embodied in such environmental 
systems should be considered on a par with the values of such systems 
as the secondary market for securities.  If a company director were to 
take action to increase the share price—even if only temporarily—it 
would likely be evaluated as wholly positive under existing corporate 
law, even if all benefit were to go to traders in the secondary market, 
rather than to the company or its stable members. 
The law should thus account for the particular, systemic logic 
of management behavior in a family, just as it would import 
principles from accounting, finance or any other appropriate body of 
organized knowledge recognized as relevant under corporate law.  
Just as a director’s decision might be judicially validated if made to 
save a company tax payments is taken under best-practice advice by 
a competent financial institution, or seen to reduce the risk against the 
default of a counterparty, so too should duties allow strategic 
rationale from a family system in order to protect company values, 
such as to preserve autonomy, preserve a given culture, or reduce 
succession risk at times of generational handover. 
2. Legitimizing the CCP in Chinese SOEs 
As discussed in Part III, Chinese SOEs currently operate 
under rules of corporate governance very similar to those used in any 
major system of corporate law.  Nevertheless, members of 
management are selected by the CCP and expected to carry out 
broader social policies set by the CCP.  These parallel planes of 
governance operate without any particular method of mutual 
accommodation or even transparency regarding their existence.  
Particularly because the CCP governs China as a fully sovereign 
country with control over its legislative process, this contradiction 
between law and practice is both unusual and unnecessary.  Structural 
couplings similar to those discussed above for the family could be 
easily incorporated into corporate law, and nothing but the 
disapproval of international investors could hinder China from doing 
so. 
First, the company law could be amended so that directors 
could be both allowed to follow CCP policy without fear of breaching 
a duty to the company and also required to do so.  Second, if policies 
set by the CCP are recognized as objects of the company, affirmative 
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actions available to members would exist to ensure their enforcement, 
both against directors and—through an action similar to unfair 
prejudice—against shareholders.  This would allow China to sell 
control of SOEs without abandoning the company’s commitment to 
CCP policy.  Third, the existing two-tier board structure of Chinese 
companies could be used to create a structure in which CCP members 
populate one board that then controls the population of a second 
board, which could be opened up to any qualified manager.  As 
mentioned above, because China is a sovereign with control over its 
own laws, only market disapproval could prevent China from making 
such changes to its law.   
The model of company law China has accepted is designed 
for use by the financial system, and investors would certainly prefer 
that this remain the only system beyond corporate law that is allowed 
to shape the corporate form.  Particularly in light of the probability 
that the large Chinese SOEs do not finance themselves primarily on 
the financial markets, 159  but though revenues from ongoing 
operations, a continued primacy of the financial system over Chinese 
company law seems unjustified.  While international investors may 
at first impression find such accommodation dangerous to their 
interests, they should understand that such exercise of power in any 
case exists, and its exercise within an orderly and transparent 
framework brings not only dignity to the Chinese state (which 
currently bends the law in a dubious manner), but also predictability 
and transparency for investors. 
If China as sovereign were to undertake such amendments, 
they could be made neutral to a system, so that both families using 
private firms and the CCP using SOEs could employ the corporate 
form without being hampered by the inherited subordination of 
corporate law to the needs of the financial system. 
                                                                                                               
 159  A sample of ten prospectuses issued by major SOEs in connection with their initial 
public offerings shows that six planned to use the proceeds to “strengthen their capital base,” 
another had no plans for the funds, and only three expressed any intention to actively invest 
the proceeds or pay down debt.  The six companies that injected the funds into capital were 
China Construction Bank Corporation, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd, Bank 
of China Limited, China Life Insurance Company Limited, Ping An Insurance (Group) 
Company of China, Ltd.; the one with no plans was Tencent Holdings Limited; and those 
with concrete uses for the funds were PetroChina Co Ltd, China Shipping Container Lines 
Co Ltd, and China Telecom Corporation Limited. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Corporate law in its current form is surprisingly rigid and 
blind to the other systems of value that operate in interlocking 
relationships within companies as essential parts of the corporate 
environment.  These systems are recognized in corporate law 
primarily to the extent that they influence a corporate actor, and such 
influence is often condemned as a conflict of interest.  When the stock 
corporation is conceived as a closed system with only the most 
marginal recognition of the various value networks intersecting with 
it, the corporate form becomes far less useful than it could otherwise 
be.  This state of affairs is particularly disturbing in Asia where most 
companies are operated by families.  In China, a very significant 
number of the largest firms in the economy are owned by the state 
and guided by the CCP.  If we take the theoretical step to understand 
corporate law as a system, the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann 
allows us to create “structural couplings” that can be introduced 
between corporate law and systematic networks of value such as 
family, the state, or a political party. 
To begin the exercise of coupling corporate law with its 
environment, this paper has singled out two ideologically opposed 
examples—the commercially active family and the CCP within 
Chinese SOEs—as social systems of value that make use of the 
corporate form to pursue commercial ends.  The values of such 
systems are not always congruent with the rights and duties provided 
for in traditional corporate law, which have been designed mainly to 
facilitate and protect trading in corporate shares on secondary capital 
markets.  Such fundamental features of corporate law like legal 
personality, limited liability and transferable shares exist in order to 
meet the needs of the financial system.  While protection of investors 
in such markets is a goal that should be taken into account, it should 
not be overvalued.  For large companies, initial public offerings may 
be of little use as a source of finance, and their utility as a form of 
prestige and advertising must be balanced against the pressure the 
IPO generates for short-term focus.  The goals of the controlling 
shareholders operating a company’s planning in the markets for 
products and services are much more important for a corporation’s 
viability than the needs of secondary market traders.  Secondary 
market traders make no capital contribution to the company except 
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the promise of liquidity, and this promise actually serves financial 
investors themselves more directly than it does the capital costs of the 
issuing company and the financial position of its controlling 
shareholders, who in most cases have no plans to engage in active 
trading. 
Particularly in light of the fact that the corporate form has 
been repeatedly adjusted to the needs of the financial markets, it is 
highly unusual that changes have not yet been made to allow efficient 
use of the company by organizations such as families, whose driving 
logic does not always accord with the prevalent logic of corporate 
law.  Further adjustments can be made to accommodate other systems.  
Both the measure of skills in the duty of care applied to directors and 
the equitable considerations used to determine whether a company 
has been operated in an unfairly prejudicial manner are examples of 
structural couplings linking corporate law to the surrounding 
environment.   
In the same way, the duties of directors and the objects of the 
company can be adjusted toward systemic aims of the family or a 
political party like the CCP to couple their needs with corporate law.  
Moreover, the arrangement of management organs can be easily 
adjusted in the Hong Kong legal system (where such organs are 
shaped in the articles of association) or in mainland China (whose 
legal system is controlled by the CCP) to introduce a dedicated board 
for family or party members to meet and make decisions.  In China, 
the fact that corporate law reflects the financial-market-focused 
model leads to distortions of corporate governance, which creates a 
significant and troublesome discrepancy between law-on-the-books 
and law-as-enforced.  The only barrier to the Chinese government 
enacting corporate law that allows for efficient use of the corporate 
form by its SOEs or family firms is the displeasure of international 
investors and the perceptions of market quality that track their 
interests. 
Beyond family firms and SOEs, the same use of structural 
couplings could integrate CSR or governance design for corporate 
sustainability deeply within the operation of a corporation.  This work 
could be pursued within the same systems theory model of analysis. 
If corporate law continues to disregard deep-seated and powerful 
value systems that interlock with most of the corporations operating 
globally, and those calling for a more socially responsible corporate 
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form do not look to systemic change, the corporate form will remain 
inefficient for its users and overly supportive of its own 
financialization.  An adjustment of the basic architecture, however, 
could trigger substantial synergies between such systems and the 
company. 
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